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To Measure Is to Know
- James Clark Maxwell'
I. Introduction
Information is the lifeblood of modern society. Businesses, non-profit
organizations, and government agencies regularly compile and maintain
electronic databases of information about individuals who interact with
these institutions. Computerized data include contact information, personal
histories, financial records, and official identifiers such as social security
numbers. This wealth of information allows business and government to
operate more efficiently, but also exposes the persons to whom the
information relates to risks such as identity theft, monetary losses, loss of
intellectual property, loss of privacy and reputation, stalking, and
blackmail. 2
Malevolent code, such as computer viruses and worms, are powerful
weapons in the hands of cyber rogues. Viruses and worms can be
programmed to corrupt, delete, or steal sensitive information. Also, cyber
terrorists can exploit malevolent code to disrupt elements of the national
critical information infrastructure, such as banking, transportation,
communications, and energy provision systems. A recent denial of service
attack 3 on the Port of Houston, for instance, made crucial navigating data
on the port's Web service temporarily unavailable to shipping pilots and
1. Quoted in ANDREW JAQUITH, SECURITY METRICS REPLACING FEAR, UNCERTAINTY,
AND DOUBT xv (2007).
2. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 16-26 (2004) (describing history and use of databases in private sector); J.
Howard Beales, III, Remarks, Symposium on the Patriot Act, Consumer Privacy, and
Cybercrime, 5 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2003) See also Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of
Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S.
CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007) ("A defining problem of the Information Age is securing computer
databases of ultra sensitive personal information. These reservoirs of data fuel our Internet
economy but endanger individuals when their information escapes into the hands of cyber
criminals."); A Chronology of Data Breaches, www.privacyrights.org/ar
/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last modified April 2, 2008).
3. A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack aims to deprive legitimate users of a
resource or service provided by a system, by overloading the system with a flood of data packets,
thus preventing it from processing legitmate requests. See, e.g., Meiring de Villiers, Distributed
Denial of Service: Law, Technology & Policy. 39 WORLD JURIS LAW/TECH. J. 1 (2006) (an
interdisciplinary analysis of allocation of liability among multiple tortfeasors for distributed
denial of service attacks on vulnerable systems).
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mooring companies, creating risks of substantial collision and other
threats.4
Viruses and worms gain unauthorized access to a system, such as the
Port of Houston's Web service, by exploiting security lapses, such as
unpatched security vulnerabilities.5 A security vulnerability is an error in
an information system that an intruder can exploit to violate the system's
security policy.6  A security vulnerability in an automated bank teller
program, for instance, may allow a rogue to capture sensitive information
such as personal identity ("PIN") numbers of previous users.7
This article presents an analysis of civil liability for failure to
safeguard confidential information. It focuses on situations where database
owners fail to patch a computer security vulnerability, which facilitates
compromise of sensitive information. Professor Robert Rabin has termed
wrongdoing of this kind an "enabling tort."'8 An enabling tort occurs when
a negligent act by a primary tortfeasor sets the stage for an intervening
tortfeasor to commit a tort or crime. 9 Professor Mark Grady has developed
a theory explaining that a primary tortfeasor's liability will be preserved for
enabling conduct that foreseeably encouraged intervening tortfeasors who
are so-called "free radicals."' 0 Free radicals are individuals who are not
deterred by the threat of liability, and include persons such as mentally
incompetent people, terrorists, and criminals." Research has shown that
cyber rogues generally fit the profile of free radicals. 12
4 See STEVE GIBSON, THE STRANGE TALE OF THE DENIAL OF SERVICE: ATTACKS
AGAINST GRC.COM, available at www.crime-research.org/library/grcdos.pdf.
5. A "patch" is a software update which is overlaid on an existing program in order to fix a
vulnerability in the program. A patch is usually a temporary remedy, to be used until a more
permanent remediation of the vulnerability becomes available. See ROBERT SLADE, DICTIONARY
OF INFORMATION SECURITY 139 (2006).
6. See William L. Fithen et al., Formal Modeling of Vulnerability, BELL LABS TECH. J.
Feb. 5, 2004, at 173, 173-74.
7. See CHARLES P. PFLEEGER & SHARI L. PFLEEGER. SECURITY IN COMPUTING 116 (4th
ed., 2007).
8. See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (1999).
9. Id. at 437 ("Beyond the immediate perpetrator of harm, the victim perceives the
individual, or more often, the enterprise, that set the stage for the suffering that unfolded. The
Enabler."). See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(owner of apartment complex alleged to have enabled criminal activity by carelessly allowing
security measures at the building to deteriorate).
10. See Mark F. Grady, The Free Radicals of Tort, II S. CT. ECON. REV. 189 (2004).
11. Id. at 191. See also Rabin, supra note 8, at 439 ("The key factor counseling liability...
is that defendant paved the way for a truly reckless individual to be imposing serious risks of
injury on the public at large.").
12. See generally Meiring de Villiers, Free Radicals in Cyberspace. Complex Liability
Issues in Information Warfare, 4 N.W. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. J. 13 (2005).
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Foreseeability of an intervening tortfeasor's action is essential to
imposing liability on a primary tortfeasor for enabling the intervenor's
behavior.' 3 In a civil suit against a database owner for failure to patch a
vulnerability, foreseeability of exploitation of the vulnerability is a key
element of the liability analysis, and the focus of this article. The article
provides judicial decision-makers with a theoretical basis and practical
methodology to make an informed and rational decision about reasonable
foreseeability in the context of an information security breach.
The main contribution of the article to legal scholarship is its analysis
of the law and technology of cyber attacks that exploit computer security
vulnerabilities. The analysis identifies features that make exploitation of a
computer security vulnerability reasonably foreseeable. The article studies
traditional tort cases where a primary tortfeasor enabled a crime or tort
perpetrated by an intervenor, and identifies factors that, in the view of the
courts, made the intervenor's behavior foreseeable. The analysis develops
cyber analogues of these features, and shows that vulnerabilities are likely
to be exploited if they are easy to exploit; are technically closely aligned
with the objectives of cyber attackers; provide unauthenticated access to a
target system; provide remote access; provide anonymous access; and
exhibit low access complexity.
Richardson v. Ham14 illustrates the meaning of these "foreseeability
features" and describes their common law origins. In Richardson, the
defendants left an unlocked bulldozer parked overnight in a public area.
Three inebriated young men started one of the bulldozers, set it in motion,
and then abandoned it, allowing the runaway bulldozer to plough through a
residential area.' 5 Plaintiffs who suffered injuries and property damage
filed suit against the owners of the bulldozer, alleging that they were
negligent in leaving the machine unattended and unlocked.' 6 In imposing a
duty of care on the defendants, the court emphasized factors that made the
intermeddling foreseeable.
The bulldozer was easily accessible to intermeddlers, as it was left
unlocked and unattended in a public area. A relatively unskilled person
could start the machine and set the bulldozer in motion, even though he
may not have the skill to stop it. Once intermeddlers gained basic access to
the bulldozer, they faced no additional hurdles to starting the engine and
setting it in motion. The bulldozer was fuelled up, and the engine could be
13. See Grady, supra note 10, at 214; Rabin, supra note 8, at 446 (calling foreseeability in
workplace hazard enabling torts as "the battleground... of the third party intervenor story"). See
also Rabin, supra note 8, at 447, 450.
14. Richardson v. Ham, 285 P.2d 269 (Cal. 1955).
15. Id. at 270.
16. Id.
[30:419HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY IN INFORMATION SECURITY LAW
started with the bulldozer in gear by simply pushing in a lever and stepping
on the starter. If so started, the bulldozer would be set in motion
immediately. In addition, the bulldozer was left parked overnight, which
provided intermeddlers with a significant time window of opportunity.
Bulldozers are relatively uncommon and present a greater attraction to
intermeddlers than other vehicles. The public's fascination with bulldozers
made unattended bulldozers a more foreseeable target of intermeddlers
than, for instance, an ordinary automobile with its key left in the ignition.
The factors that made intermeddling foreseeable in Richardson have
direct analogues in cyberspace. The intermeddlers had unauthenticated
access to the bulldozer. "Unauthenticated access" generally refers to access
without a valid key or identity validation. 7  In information security,
authentication refers to procedures by which a computer system verifies the
identity of a party from whom it has received a communication, such as a
login procedure. A system with a vulnerability that allows the
authentication barrier to be bypassed is the cyber analogue of an unlocked
vehicle in a public place, such as the bulldozer in Richardson.
A computer security vulnerability is considered easy to exploit if it
requires minimal technical sophistication to leverage.18 A system with a
vulnerability that is easy to exploit would be accessible to a relatively
unskilled hacker, just as in Richardson, where a relatively unskilled person
could start the bulldozer and set it in motion. Common sense suggests, and
the Richardson decision confirms, that an easily exploitable vulnerability is
relatively foreseeably exploited.
A computer security vulnerability has low access complexity if an
attacker faces no additional barriers to exploiting the vulnerability after
gaining basic access to a target system.19 Low access complexity is
characterized by features such as a large window of opportunity to gain
access and no complications beyond basic access. 20  The Richardson
intermeddlers faced low access complexity: the bulldozer was conveniently
fueled up, and the bulldozer could be set in motion at the push of a lever
and a step on the starter. Additionally, the bulldozer was left parked
overnight, which provided intermeddlers with a significant window of
17. See, e.g., THE OXFORD THESAURUS (American Edition, 1992) (Defining "authenticate"
as "verify, validate, certify, substantiate, endorse, vouch for, corroborate.").
18. See JAMES C. FOSTER ET AL., BUFFER OVERFLOW ATTACKS 10 (2005); SYMANTEC
INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT TRENDS FOR JULY - DECEMBER 06 90 (2007), available at
http://eval.symantec/mktginfo/enterprise/ent-whitepaper-intemet-security-threat-report
xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf.
19. See, e.g., Peter Mell, Karen Scarfone, & Sasha Romanosky, Common Vulnerability




opportunity. Low access complexity is clearly an attractive property to
cyber attackers as well as their real-space siblings, such as the Richardson
intermeddlers.
An opportunity is scarce or unique if it is aligned with the objectives
of a criminal or tortfeasor and if there are few equivalent alternative
opportunities available. The unusual fascination of the public with
bulldozers in Richardson made it a scarce opportunity to intermeddlers. A
computer security vulnerability may likewise constitute a scarce
opportunity to an attacker who uses a specialist virus or worm that is
programmed to exploit the particular vulnerability. The attractiveness of
such a vulnerability over ordinary vulnerabilities without this feature is
analogous to the public's heightened fascination with bulldozers, as
compared to ordinary automobiles.
The article concludes by proposing a numerical metric of the degree to
which a particular cyberspace vulnerability is foreseeably exploitable. The
metric is a function of quantitative proxies of the "foreseeability features"
identified by the analysis. The article includes a numerical example
illustrating the application of the metric to vulnerabilities that have actually
been exploited in cyber attacks.
Following this introduction, Section 2 provides a background on
malevolent software and Section 3 discusses how viruses and worms are
threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information
online. Next, Section 4 discusses the role of computer security
vulnerabilities in cyber attacks. Section 5 analyzes the legal duty of
database owners to safeguard confidential information and the role of
reasonable foreseeability in the liability analysis. Section 6 then provides a
forensic analysis of foreseeability in the context of information security.
Section 7 subsequently presents a numerical metric of the degree to which
a particular vulnerability is foreseeably exploitable, as well as an example
illustrating the application of the metric to "real world" vulnerabilities.
Finally, Section 8 discusses and concludes.
II. Principles of Malevolent Software
Malevolent software is a term for computer code that is designed to
disrupt the operation of a computer system.21 Computer viruses and its
common variant, the worm, are the most common of these rogue programs.
Other forms of malicious software include so-called logic bombs,22 Trojan
horses,23 and trapdoors.24
21. See SLADE, supra note 5, at 118.
22. A logic bomb is "a section of code, preprogrammed into a larger program that waits for
a trigger event to perform a harmful function. Logic bombs do not reproduce and are therefore
[30:419
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A. Computer Viruses
The term "virus," Latin for "poison," was first formally defined by Dr.
Fred Cohen in 1983.25 The concept, however, originated in John von
Neumann's studies of self-replicating mathematical automata in the
261940s. A computer virus is a series of instructions (a program) that (i)
infects a host program by attaching itself to the host, (ii) executes when the
host is executed, and (iii) spreads by cloning itself, or part of itself, and
attaching the clones to other host programs. In addition, many viruses have
a so-called payload capable of harmful side effects, such as deleting,
stealing, or modifying digital information.27 As the definition suggests, a
typical computer virus consists of three basic modules or mechanisms,
namely an infection module, a payload trigger, and a payload.
1. Infection Module
An infection module enables a virus to reproduce and attach copies of
itself onto target hosts, such as a computer or network. 28 This mechanism
is the most salient technical property of a computer virus.2 9  The first task
of the infection mechanism is to locate a prospective host program. Once a
suitable host is found, the virus may take precautions, such as checking
not viral, but a virus may contain a logic bomb as a payload." PETER SZOR, THE ART OF
COMPUTER VIRUS RESEARCH AND DEFENSE 30 (2005).
23. A Trojan horse is a program that appears to be beneficial, but contains a harmful
payload. Slade, supra note 5, at 663.
24. A trapdoor, or backdoor, is a function built into a program or system to allow
unauthorized access to the system. Id. at 643. See also DOROTHY E. DENNING & PETER J.
DENNING, INTERNET BESIEGED 75-78 (1998).
25. FRED COHEN, COMPUTER VIRUSES (1984) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern
California).
26. See Rick Lehtinen et al., COMPUTER SECURITY BASICS 83 (2006) ("[T]he roots of the
modem computer virus go back to 1949. This was when computer pioneer John Von Neumann
presented a paper on the 'Theory and Organization of Complicated Automata,' in which he
postulated that a computer program could reproduce."). See also DENNING & DENNING, supra
note 24, at 74; Jeffrey 0. Kephart et al., Fighting Computer Viruses, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,
November 1997, at 56.
27. JOHN MACAFEE & COLIN HAYNES, COMPUTER VIRUSES, WORMS, DATA DIDDLERS,
KILLER PROGRAMS, AND OTHER THREATS TO YOUR SYSTEM, 26 (1989); FREDERICK B. COHEN,
A SHORT COURSE ON COMPUTER VIRUSES 1-2 (2d ed. 1994). In his Ph.D. dissertation, Dr.
Cohen defined a virus simply as any program capable of self-reproduction. This definition
appears overly general. A literal interpretation of the definition would classify even programs
such as compilers and editors as viral. DENNING & DENNING, supra note 24, at 75.
28. See ED SKOUDIS, MALWARE: FIGHTING MALICIOUS CODE 31-37 (2003).
29. DENNING & DENNING, supra note 24, at 73-75; DAVID HARLEY, ROBERT SLADE & URS
E. GATTIKER, VIRUSES REVEALED 87 (2001) ("The infection mechanism is the code that allows
the virus to reproduce and infect a target host, and thus to be a virus.") (emphasis added); ROGUE
PROGRAMS: VIRUSES, WORMS, TROJAN HORSES 247 (Lance J. Hoffman ed., Van Nostrand
Reinhold, 1990) ("[tlhe ability to propagate is essential to a virus program").
2008]
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whether the host has already been infected.30 The virus then installs a copy
of itself on the host.31 Once settled, the virus may take steps to protect
itself from detection by changing its form.32 When the host program runs,
control is passed to the resident virus code, allowing it to execute. The
executing virus repeats the infection cycle by automatically replicating
itself and copying the newly created clones to other executable files on the
system or network, and even across networks.33
A virus may infect a computer or a network through several possible
points of entry, including via an infected file downloaded from the Internet,
web browsing, removable media such as writable compact disks and
DVDs, infected files in shared directories, an infected email attachment, or
even through infected commercial shrink-wrapped software.34  Early
viruses targeted the boot sectors of floppy disks, and this trend continued
into the 1990s. 35 Floppy disks are no longer widely used to share files, and
viruses are increasingly transmitted via email.36 In a 1996 national survey,
for instance, approximately 9 percent of respondents listed email as the
medium of infection of their most recent virus incident, while 71 percent
blamed infected diskettes. In 2004, the corresponding numbers were 92
percent for email, and zero percent for diskettes.37
30. Viruses, known as sparse infectors, may try to slow down the rate of infection to avoid
detection, while fast infectors, on the other hand, may attempt to infect as many hosts as possible
in a short period of time. See HARLEY, SLADE & GATTIKER, supra note 29, at 87.
31. There are three mechanisms through which a virus can infect a host program. A virus
may attach itself to its host as a shell, an add-on, or as intrusive code. A shell virus forms a layer
("shell") around the host code so that the latter effectively becomes an internal subroutine of the
virus. The host program is then replaced by a functionally equivalent program that includes the
virus. The virus executes first, and then allows the host code to execute. Boot program viruses
are typically shell viruses. Most viruses are of the add-on variety. They become part of the host
by appending, or prepending, their code to the host code, without altering the host code. The
viral code may alter the order of execution, allowing itself to execute first and then the host code.
Macro viruses are typically add-on viruses. Intrusive viruses, in contrast, overwrite some or all of
the host code, replacing it with its own code. See DENNING & DENNING, supra note 24, at 81;
PHILIP FRITES, PETER JOHNSTON & MARTIN KRATZ, THE COMPUTER VIRUS CRISIS 73-75 (2d ed.
1992).
32. A virus' capability to change its form is known as polymorphism. Detecting
polymorphic viruses requires a more complex algorithm than simple pattern matching. See
DENNING & DENNING, supra note 24, at 89. See also HARLEY, SLADE & GATTIKER, supra note
29, at 87-88.
33. See SKOUDIS, supra note 28, at 31-37.
34. See DENNING & DENNING, supra note 24, at 81; FRITES, JOHNSTON & KRATZ, supra
note 31, at 73-75.
35. See LARRY BRIDWELL, ICSA LABS 10T ANNUAL COMPUTER VIRUS PREVALENCE
SURVEY 15, tbl. 5 (2004), available at http://www.icsalabs.com/icsa/docs/html/library
/whitepapers VPS2004.pdf.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 15,Table 5 and Fig. 10.
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Email is currently the most widely used medium for exchanging files
and sharing information, but it has also become a convenient and efficient
vehicle for virus and worm propagation. Fast-spreading viruses, such as
ExploreZip and Melissa, for instance, exploited automatic mailing
programs to spread within and across networks.38 Melissa typically arrived
in the email inbox of its victim disguised as an email message with a
Microsoft Word attachment. When the recipient opened the attachment,
Melissa executed. First, it verified whether the recipient had the Microsoft
Outlook email program on its computer. If Outlook were present, Melissa
would mail a copy of itself to the first fifty names in the Outlook address
book. This email would appear to the fifty new recipients as a personal
email message sent by the user of the infected system. Melissa would then
repeat the process with each of the fifty recipients of the infected email
message (provided they had Outlook), by automatically transmitting clones
of itself to fifty more people.39 Melissa attacks frequently escalated and
resulted in clogged email servers and system crashes.4
2. Payload
In addition to replicating and spreading, viruses may be programmed
to perform specific harmful actions. The module that implements this
functionality is known as the payload.4 1 A payload can perform a wide
range of functions, depending on the aims and objectives of the virus
author.42 A payload can be programmed to perform destructive operations
such as corrupting, deleting, and stealing information. A payload may also
create a backdoor 43 that allows unauthorized access to the infected
machine. 4  Some payload effects are immediately obvious, such as a
system crash, while others are subtle, such as transposition of numbers and
38. Andy Bisset and Geraldine Shipton, Some Human Dimensions of Computer Virus
Creation and Infection, 52 INT'L J. HUM-COMPUTER STUD. 899 (2000); Richard Ford, No
Surprises in Melissa Land, 18 COMPUTERS AND SECURITY 300, 300-02 (1999).
39. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 38, at 302.
40. HARLEY, SLADE & GATTIKER, supra note 29, at 406-10.
41. JAN HRUSKA, COMPUTER VIRUSES AND ANTI-VIRUS WARFARE, 17-18 (Ellis Horwood
Ltd., 1990) (in addition to self-replicating code, viruses often also contain a payload, which is
capable of producing malicious side effects). See also COHEN, supra note 27, at 8-15 (including
examples of malignant viruses and their functions); MACAFEE & HAYNES, supra note 27, at 61.
42. See, e g., Nicholas Weaver et al., A Taxonomy of Computer Worms, 2003 ACM
Workshop on Rapid Malcode, Wash. D.C., http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=948190 ("The
payload is limited only by the imagination of the attacker.").
43. A backdoor is a method of gaining remote access to a computer without passing through
normal security controls on a system. See SLADE, supra note 5, at 19.
44. SKOUDIS, supra note 28, at 27; HARLEY, SLADE & GATTIKER, supra note 29, at 88-89;
Meiring de Villiers, Computer Viruses and Civil Liability: A Conceptual Framework, TORT
TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J., 123, 172 (2004) (discussion of damage due to virus infection).
20081
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
alteration of decimal places.45 Subtle effects tend to be dangerous because
their presence may not be detected until after substantial harm has been
done. Payloads, however, are often relatively harmless and do no more
than entertain the user with a humorous message, musical tune, or graphical
display.46
The payload is triggered when a specific condition is satisfied.
Triggering conditions come in a variety of forms, such as a specified
number of infections, a certain date, or specific time. The Friday-the-13th
virus, for instance, only activated its payload on dates with the cursed
designation.47 More recently, the first CodeRed worm alternated between
continuing its infection cycle, remaining dormant, and attacking the official
White House Web page, depending on the day of the month.48 In the
simplest case, a payload executes whenever the virus executes, without a
trigger event. Viruses do not always have a payload module, but even
viruses without a payload may harm their environment by consuming
valuable computing resources.49
B. Computer Worms
Worms are similar to viruses, but differ from them in two important
respects. Worms propagate autonomously across networks without human
intervention, and they replicate and spread without infecting a host
program.50  For instance, the CodeRed worm propagated by injecting
45. MACAFEE & HAYNES, supra note 27, at 61. See also SZOR, supra note 22, at 302-03
(describing "data diddlers" as viruses that "do not destroy data all of a sudden in a very evident
form... but [that] slowly manipulate the data, such as the content of the hard disk").
46. E.J. Sinrod and W.P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical Approach to the Application of
Federal Computer Crimes Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 117, 218
(2000) (describing the W95.LoveSong.998 virus, which was designed to trigger the host to play a
love song on a particular date).
47 See, e.g., id. at 217, n. 176.
48. See generally de Villiers, supra note 12.
49. Viruses can cause economic losses by replicating and spreading, such as when they fill
up available memory space, slow down the execution of important programs, and lock keyboards.
The Melissa virus, for instance, mailed copies of itself to everyone in the victim's email address
book, resulting in clogged email servers and even system crashes. See, e.g., FRITES, JOHNSTON &
KRATZ, supra note 31, 23-24 ("The Christmas card (virus) stopped a major international mail
system just by filling up all available storage capacity."); HARLEY, SLADE & GATTIKER, supra
note 29, at 88 ("A virus does not necessarily need to have either a trigger or payload. A virus
with a trigger and payload but no replication mechanism, on the other hand, is not a virus, but
may be described as a Trojan.").
50. See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991) (Defining a worm as "a
program that travels from one computer to another but does not attach itself to the operating
system of the computer it infects. It differs from a virus, which is also a migrating program, but
one that attaches itself to the operating system of any computer it enters and can infect any other
computer that uses files from the infected computer."); Weaver et al., supra note 42, at 11-18
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copies of itself into the memory of a remote system by exploiting a security
vulnerability in the target system. It located potential targets by scanning
the Internet for vulnerable systems, to which it propagated automatically. 5'
The typical virus in contrast, needs to attach itself to an executable file, and
then relies on human interaction to propagate across networks. Like
viruses, worms may carry destructive payloads, but even without a
destructive payload, a fast-spreading worm can do significant harm by
slowing down a system through the prolific network traffic it generates.52
The original worm was implemented by scientists at Xerox PARC in
1978. 53  The so-called Morris Worm, however, created by Cornell
University graduate student, Robert T. Morris, was the first worm to
become a household name.54 The 1989 Morris Worm used a security flaw
in a UNIX program to invade and shut down much of the Internet. By
some accounts, this event first alerted the world to the dangers of computer
security vulnerabilities, such as the buffer overflow flaw that enabled the
Morris Worm to paralyze the Internet.
5
C. Generic Structure of a Worm
A typical worm consists of the following basic components: (1) an
activation mechanism, (2) a target selection algorithm and scanning engine,
(3) a warhead, (4) a propagation engine, and (5) a payload. 56 The
activation mechanism triggers execution of the worm on the target
computer. The target selection algorithm identifies new potential targets,
and the scanning engine narrows down the selection by identifying the
vulnerable subset. The warhead penetrates the target, paving the way for
the propagation engine to move the worm body to the target. The payload,
if present, is programmed to cause harm, such as launching a denial of
service attack.
(defining a worm as "a program that self-propagates across a network exploiting security or
policy flaws in widely used services").
51. Szor, supra note 22, at 398-401.
52. See generally John F. Schoch & Jon A. Hupp, The "Worm" Programs - Early
Experience with a Distributed Computation, COMM. OF THE ACM, March 1982, at 172.
53. PARC Milestones, Innovation Milestones, http://www.parc.xerox.com/about/history
/default.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
54. See HARLEY, SLADE & GATTIKER, supra note 29, at 347-52.
55. Ari Takanen, et al., Running Malicious Code By Buffer Overflows: A Survey of Publicly
Available Exploits, EICAR 2000 BEST PAPER PROCEEDINGS, 158, 162, (2000), available at
http://www.ee.oulu.f/research/ouspg/protos/sota/EICAR2000-overflow-survey/paper.pdf ("The
day when the world finally acknowledged the risk entailed in overflow vulnerabilities and started
coordinating a response to them was the day when the Internet Worm was introduced, spread and
brought the Internet to its knees.").
56. See SKOUDIS, supra note 28, at 79-80.
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1. Activation Mechanism
A worm may be activated a number of different ways. The Melissa
Worm relied on a tantalizing message to persuade a user to open an e-mail
attachment that launched the worm. 7  Worms such as Iloveyou 58 and
Benjamin 59 employed similar tactics. The CodeRed worm self-activated by
automatically searching for and exploiting network vulnerabilities to inject
itself into the memory of a target server.
60
2. Target Selection Algorithm and Scanning Engine
A worm needs to locate new targets in order to continue spreading. Its
target selection algorithm selects Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses 61 of
potential targets. A scanning algorithm then determines whether the
computer at the selected address contains a suitable vulnerability.
62
The most basic target selection algorithm chooses an IP address at
random. The fast-spreading Slammer worm, for instance, generated random
IP addresses and sent a packet to each target, without first verifying the
validity of the IP address. 63 More sophisticated worms, such as CodeRed,
are programmed to scan a network for vulnerable IP addresses and
"fingerprint" a remote system to ascertain its vulnerability. 64 E-mail worms
such as W97M/Melissa@mm read e-mail addresses on a system and mail
copies of themselves to each address. 65 Worms may also harvest e-mail
57. The user was tempted with a subject line, such as "Here is that document you askedfor.
•. don 't show anyone else ;-)." When the recipient opened the attachment, Melissa executed. See
CERT Advisory CA-1999-04 Melissa Macro Virus, http://www.cert.org /advisories/CA-1999-
04.html (last modified March 31, 1999). See also HARLEY, SLADE & GATTIKER, supra note 29, at
406-410. Other worm infection propagators include e-mail attachment inserters, instant
messaging attacks, and SMTP attacks. See SZOR, supra note 22, at section 9.4, at 331-38.
58. CERT Advisory CA-2000-04 Love Letter Worm Virus, http://www.cert.org
/advisories/CA-2000-04.html (last modified May 9, 2000).
59. W32.Benjamin. Worm, Symantec.com, http://securityresponse.symantec.comlavcenter/
venc/data/w32.benjamin.worm.html. (last visited Mar. 26, 2008)
60. See SZOR, supra note 22, at 315.
61. Each computer on the Internet is uniquely identified by its IP address. FRED T.
HOFSTETTER, INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES AT WORK 19 (2005) ("Every computer on the Internet
has a unique Internet Protocol (IP) address. Each packet of information that gets transmitted over
the Internet contains the IF address of the computer that sent it and the IP address of the computer
to which it is being sent.").
62. SKOUDIS, supra note 28, at 84-87.
63. David Moore et al., Inside the Slammer Worm, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY,
July/August 2003, 33. Check source
64. SZOR, supra note 22, at 315.
65. The W97M/Melissa@mm worm propagated itself widely by exploiting the Microsoft
Outlook e-mail program. SZOR, supra note 22, at 319, 334.
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addresses from a mail server, a DNS server, or use search engines to
harvest addresses on the Internet.66
3. Warhead
The first step towards taking over a target computer is gaining access
to the target machine. A worm accomplishes this through its warhead,
typically by exploiting a vulnerability in the target system. Commonly
employed penetration techniques include buffer overflow exploits, e-mail
penetration, file sharing, and backdoor attacks.
a. Buffer Overflow
The buffer overflow is currently (and has been for over a decade) the
most commonly exploited vulnerability to get unauthorized access to a
system.67 A buffer overflow vulnerability allows executable malevolent
code to be copied into the memory of a target computer. A skillful attacker
can then manipulate the vulnerability to remotely execute the malevolent
code.68
b. E-mail Penetration
E-mail is a popular penetration technique. E-mail worms transmit
themselves to a target via an executable infected e-mail attachment.
Sophisticated e-mail worms, such as W32/Nimda.A@mm are programmed
to activate automatically when an infected e-mail message is read or merely
previewed.69
c. File Sharing Techniques
Some viruses and worms propagate through file-sharing mechanisms,
such as the peer-to-peer ("P2P") services, which include Gnutella and
Kazaa.70 Each member ("peer") of a P2P network maintains a shared
folder with files made available to other peers for downloading. Files that
66. See id. at 319-24.
67. See ERIC CHIEN AND PETER SZOR, BLENDED ATTACK EXPLOITS, VULNERABILITIES
AND BUFFER-OVERFLOW TECHNIQUES IN COMPUTER VIRUSES (2002), available at
http://www.peterszor.com/blended.pdf. See infra § IV(A) for a discussion of the buffer overflow.
68. See infra § IV(A) for a discussion of the buffer overflow.
69. See SZOR, supra note 22, at 414,-15.
70. See SKOUDIS, supra note 28, at 51; Kim Zetter, Kazaa Delivers More Than Tunes,
WIRED, Jan. 1, 2004, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2004/01/61852 (reporting that




are exchanged over a P2P network may be infected with malevolent code
capable of infecting a user's computer when downloaded and opened.71
d. Propagation Through Backdoor Interfaces
Some worms use backdoor interfaces to propagate themselves. A
backdoor is a software or hardware mechanism that can be used to gain
remote access to a computer without passing through normal security
controls.72 An attacker can exploit a backdoor to take control of a system
and compromise sensitive information.73 A backdoor may, for instance,
consist of a password recognition routine installed in the computer as a
modification of a legitimate program. The routine would enable a hacker
who provided the correct password to gain access to confidential files and
programs on the computer.74 Worms that utilize backdoor interfaces
include the Nimda worm, which took advantage of a backdoor opened by
CodeRed. The W32/Borm worm used network scanning and fingerprinting
techniques to locate backdoor-compromised systems.
75
4. Propagation Engine
The propagation engine moves the body of the worm to the target.
The warhead may, for instance, execute a program such as the File Transfer
Protocol,76 in order to move the worm's code. The transported worm then
installs itself on the machine, loads its code into the memory, and prepares
to run on the system. An efficient worm carries its entire body of code
within its warhead. In the case of e-mail worms, such as the SQL
Slammer, the entire body is usually included in the e-mail attachment.
77
5. Payload
The payload is an optional, but common component of computer
worms. It consists of special code designed to achieve a specific aim of the
attacker. The payload may, for instance, display a simple one-time
71. SHIN ET AL., MALWARE PREVALENCE IN THE KAZAA FILE-SHARING NETWORK, 1
(2006), www.imconf.net/imc-2006/papers/p34-shin.pdf. Some authors prefer the term "virus"
rather than "worm" for malevolent code that spreads via a P2P network, because of its reliance on
human intervention. Id. at 3, n. 4.
72. See SLADE, supra note 5, at 19-20.
73. See SKOUDIS, supra note 28, at 190.
74. See SZOR, supra note 22, at 309-11. See also J. NAZARIO ET AL., THE FUTURE OF
INTERNET WORMS, 6 (2001), http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-01/JoseNazario/bh-
usa-01-Joes-Nazario.pdf.
75. See SZOR, supra note 22, at 331.
76. File Transfer Protocol, or FTP, is a popular file transfer program used to move files
across networks. See SLADE, supra note 5, at 84-85.
77. See SKOUDIS, supra note 28, at 82-83.
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message or graphic image. Some payloads perform more destructive acts,
such as deleting, stealing, or corrupting information. Payloads may also
install spyware, disable anti-virus software, and open up a backdoor to
allow remote access to an attacker.78
Il. Viruses and Worms As Threats to Information Security
Modem information security has three basic components: (1)
confidentiality, (2) integrity, and (3) availability. 79 Confidentiality refers to
the prevention of unauthorized access to sensitive information. 80 Integrity
refers to the protection of digital data from unauthorized change, such as
corruption or deletion. 81 Availability refers to procedures and safeguards
ensuring that authorized users have access to information in a convenient
format when it is needed.82 Computer viruses and worms threaten the
components of information security through their capability to replicate,
spread, and perhaps execute a payload.83 The infection module also serves
to export and multiply the effect of a payload, if the virus has a payload.
A. Malevolent Code Threatens the Confidentiality of Information
A virus or worm can be programmed to access and steal confidential
information on a system.8 4 The W32/Bugbear@mm family of viruses, for
instance, was designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the Outlook e-mail
program to gain access to machines, steal confidential information using a
key-logging function, and interfere with antivirus software. It also created
a backdoor for hackers to take over the machine and misappropriate
passwords and confidential financial information. Some members of the
Bugbear family specifically targeted financial institutions.85
78 See HARLEY, SLADE, & GATTIKER, supra note 29, at 88-89.
79. See MATT BISHOP, INTRODUCTION To COMPUTER SECURITY, 1-6 (2005); LEHTNEN ET
AL., supra note 26, at 9.
80. See LEHTINEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 9 ("Data is confidential if it stays obscure to all
but those authorized to use it.").
81. See id. at 11.
82. See id. at 9; PFLEEGER & PFLEEGER, supra note 7, at 17-20.
83 See HARLEY, SLADE, & GATIKER, supra note 29, at 97 ("Direct damage can be
considered in terms of the classic tripartite model (namely) Availability, Integrity,
Confidentiality. Viruses... have an impact across all three areas described by this model, as well
as other areas, such as accountability.").
84. See SKOUDIS, supra note 28, at 34 (viruses can "steal files from your machine,
especially sensitive ones containing personal, financial, or other sensitive information"). Viruses
also monitor user keystrokes and transmit information about the user's computing habits, Web
sites visited, and financial information to the attacker. Id. at 3.
85. Virus Makes Unwelcome Return, BBC NEWS BULLETIN, June 5, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/technology/2965924.stm. See also July, 2003 CCS News: Monthly
Virus Update: Klez.H, Sobig.E and Bugbear.B Worms Dominate, www.lbl.gov/ITSD/CIS
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Viruses and worms often use fake e-mail addresses and Web sites to
deceive users into disclosing confidential information. This technique is
called "phishing." The W32/Mimail.I@mm worm, for instance, displayed
dialogues, purportedly from PayPal, requesting financial information from
unwitting users. The stolen information would then be encrypted and
transmitted to the attacker. 6
B. Malevolent Code Threatens the Integrity of Information
Viral payloads can be programmed to delete, modify, or corrupt
information on infected computers. 87 The infamous Michelangelo virus,
for instance, was programmed to overwrite part of the hard disk of its
host.88 The Hungarian Filler virus exhibited a misplaced sense of humor.
Its payload deleted data and replaced the missing sectors with 0/1
characters arranged in the form of large smiley faces. 89
In January, 2003, a young Welshman, Simon Vallor, was sentenced to
two years imprisonment for releasing fast-spreading viruses via e-mail that
were designed to corrupt data on the hard drives of infected computers. 90
Viruses often corrupt information by replicating and spreading alone,
without the help of a payload. Leading anti-virus researcher, Peter Szor,
writes, "[v]irus replication has many side-effects. This includes the
possibility of accidental data loss when the machine crashes due to a bug in
the virus code or accidental overwriting of a part of the disk with relevant
data. Virus researchers call this kind of virus a no payload virus." 91 The
so-called Stone virus was a "no payload virus" which destroyed data by
causing machines to crash, merely by prolific replication and spreading.
92
/compnews/2003/July/08-MVU.html (describing the W32.Sobig and Klez worms, which have
been programmed to steal confidential information on infected machines); Gregg Keizer, Virus
Posing as Microsoft e-Mail Spreads Fast, TECH WEB NETWORK, Sept. 19, 2003,
http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20030919S0005 (describing a fast-spreading worm
which attempts to steal confidential information from infected systems).
86. SZOR, supra note 22, at 309.
87. See Computer Virus, THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, (6th ed. 2007),
http://www.bartleby.com/65/co/computer-vir.html ("Although some viruses are merely
disruptive, others can destroy or corrupt data or cause an operating system or applications
program to malfunction.").
88. See SZOR, supra note 22, at 301.
89. Id. at 302.
90. Computer Virus Author Jailed, BBC NEWS BULLETIN, Jan. 21, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/wales/2678773.stm.
91. SZOR, supra note 22, at 296, 297.
92. Id. at 297.
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C. Malevolent Code Threatens the Availability of Information
Fast-spreading viruses make infected systems unavailable to
legitimate users by monopolizing valuable computational resources. 93 A
recent denial of service attack on the Port of Houston, for instance, made
crucial navigating data on the port's web service temporarily unavailable to
shipping pilots and mooring companies, creating substantial risks of
collisions and other issues.94 The W32/Slammer worm overloaded Internet
routers and slowed down networks worldwide, making it difficult to use e-
mail. The paralyzing effect of Slammer on the Internet also caused ATM
failures and interfered with elections.95  The Sasser worm scanned so
aggressively for new target computers that it caused networks to become
congested and slow down. In Australia, Sasser disrupted Railcorp trains
and brought down the computer system of a major Australian financial
institution, Westpac Bank. In the UK, Sasser caused flight delays and
brought down the computerized mapping systems of several coastguard
stations.96
IV. Computer Security Vulnerabilities
A security vulnerability is an error in an information system that an
intruder can exploit to violate the system's security policy. 97 A system's
security policy protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
information contained in the system by controlling access to the system.98
The information system of a bank may, for instance, allow a customer to
93 See HARLEY, SLADE & GATTIKER, supra note 29, at 94 ("Network and mail viral
programs carry, in a sense, their own payloads. The reproduction of the programs themselves use
the resources of the hosts affected and, in the cases of both the Morris Internet and CHRISTMA
worms, went so far as to deny service by using all available computing or communications
resources."); GREG HOGLUND & GARY MCGRAw, EXPLOITING SOFTWARE: HOW TO BREAK
CODE 20 (2004) ("Worms allow an attacker to carpet bomb a network in an unbridled exploration
that attempts to exploit a given vulnerability as widely as possible. This amplifies the overall
effect of an attack and achieves results that could never be obtained by manually hacking one
machine at a time."). See also SZOR, supra note 22, at 306-307.
94. See generally GIBSON, supra note 4.
95. SZOR, supra note 22, at 306.
96. Worm Brings Down Coastguard PCs, BBC NEWS BULLETIN, May 4, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3682803.stm.
97. Fithen et al., supra note 6, at 174 (defining a vulnerability as "an unplanned system
feature that an intruder may exploit, if he/she can establish certain preconditions, to achieve
particular impacts on that system that violate its security policy"). See also SYMANTEC
INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT TRENDS FOR JULY 05 - DECEMBER 05 45 (2006),
http://www.symantec.com/business/theme.jsp?themeid=threatreport (follow link for Vol. IX,
March 2006) (defining vulnerabilities as "design or implementation errors in information systems
that can result in a compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of information
stored upon or transmitted over the affected system").
98. Fithen et al., supra note 6, at 174.
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access her own account through login authentication, but restrict her from
accessing any other information. A system vulnerability facilitates
violations of such a security policy. A backdoor in an automated bank
teller program, for instance, may allow a rogue who enters a special
number on the keypad to capture sensitive information, such as the
personal identity numbers ("PIN") of previous users.
99
Fast-spreading worms often propagate via specific, known
vulnerabilities. The W32/CodeRed worm, for instance, propagates on
vulnerable servers running Microsoft's Internet Information Server (IIS)
software. CodeRed infects a server by exploiting a buffer overflow
vulnerability 00 in Microsoft's IIS to inject itself into the server's memory.
It then executes and propagates further by searching IP addresses for new
vulnerable web servers to infect)' ° CodeRed depends on the presence of
this specific vulnerability to propagate. More flexible worms, such as
W32/Welchia, are capable of exploiting multiple vulnerabilities to invade
any system on which at least one of the exploitable vulnerabilities is
present. 1
02
Vendors usually promptly issue software patches to fix newly
discovered vulnerabilities. Users tend to be slow in implementing vendor-
provided patches, however, so that vulnerabilities often remain susceptible
to exploitation.10 3  Successive generations of CodeRed, for instance,
continued to plague the Internet despite the fact that details of the attacks
and the exploited vulnerability had been widely publicized, and that a
security patch to fix the vulnerability had been made available even before
the original CodeRed attack.
10 4
99. PFLEEGER & PFLEEGER, supra note 7, at 116.
100. See infra IV(A) for a discussion of the buffer overflow vulnerability.
101. PFLEEGER & PFLEEGER, supra note 7, at 137.
102. See SZOR, supra note 22, at 98.
103. See Stephen E. Henderson & Matthew E. Yarbrough, Suing the Insecure?: A Duty of
Care in Cyberspace, 32 N.M. L. REV. 11, 16 (2002) (many computer systems are knowingly
insecure, in part on account of failure to install readily available software patches). See also
George V. Hulme, One Step Ahead, INFORMATIONWEEK, May 20, 2002 available at
http://www.informationweek.com/news/software/development/showArticle.jhtmljsessionid
=TC5IJZGD IZ IEMQSNDLPCKHOCJUNN2JVN?articlelD=6502396& requestid=693698
(citing estimates suggesting that even if 90 percent of the users of a particular technology with a
newly discovered vulnerability could be trusted to implement the security patch issued by the
vendor, the remaining unpatched systems could still allow enough hijackings to launch a denial of
service attack on millions of other systems and networks). The CodeRed attacks occurred shortly
after Microsoft had discovered the vulnerability and issued a patch to fix it.
Virus News, BOULDER.NET, www.cuisine.net/virus.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
104. See JOSE NAzARIO, DEFENSES AND STRATEGIES AGAINST INTERNET WORMS 98
(2004).
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A. The Buffer Overflow
The so-called buffer overflow has been exploited by worms such as
the Morris Worm and CodeRed, amongst many others, and is (currently)
the most commonly exploited security vulnerability. 0 5 A buffer overflow
vulnerability allows executable malevolent code to be copied into the
memory of a target computer. A skillful attacker can then manipulate the
invaded computer to remotely execute the injected code.
1. What is a Buffer?
Buffers are data storage areas in computer memory with limited
capacity. Buffers often function as temporary storage for data to be
transferred between two devices that are not operating at the same speed.
The purpose of the temporary storage is to coordinate speed differentials
between the adjacent devices. A printer, for instance, is not capable of
printing data at the speed at which it receives the data from a computer. A
buffer in the interface between the computer and printer resolves this
bottleneck, by receiving the data from the computer and temporarily storing
it. The buffer then relays the information to the printer, at the printer's
speed, while the computer is freed up to carry on with other tasks.
10 6
A buffer overflow occurs when a program attempts to fill a buffer
with more data than it was designed to hold. A buffer overflow is
analogous to pouring ten ounces of water into a glass designed to hold eight
ounces. The water must obviously overflow somewhere and create a mess.
The glass represents a buffer and the water the application or user data.'
0 7
The excess data typically overflows into adjacent memory locations where
it can corrupt existing data, possibly changing the instructions, which
results in unintended executions.
The "unintended executions" could be relatively harmless, but could
also be malicious by design. In a relatively benign scenario, the buffer
overflow will merely cause the corrupted program to abort, without much
further harm. 1°8 In a darker scenario, a buffer overflow could allow a
105. See Benjamin A. Kuperman et al., Detection and Prevention of Stack Buffer Overflow
Attacks, COMM. OF THE ACM, November 2005 at 50 (describing the buffer overflow
vulnerability as "a security vulnerability that has been discussed for 40 years yet remains one of
the most frequently reported types of remote attacks against computer systems"); SZOR, supra
note 22, at 413. See also CHIEN & SZOR, supra note 67.
106. WILLIAM S. DAVIS & T.M RAJKUMAR, OPERATING SYSTEMS: A SYSTEMATIC VIEW,
27, 28 (6th ed., 2004).
107. MARK E. DONALDSON, INSIDE THE BUFFER OVERFLOW ATTACK: MECHANISM,
METHOD, & PREVENTION 3 (GSEC vers. 1.3, 2002), available at https://www2.sans.org
/readingroorn/whitepapers/securecode/386.php?portal=9d0785 ldff825 la34a4bcaacc23dcee3.
108. A buffer overflow may, for instance, abort the application program, resulting in a
segmentation fault and core dump. See, e.g., RANDAL E. BRYANT ET AL., COMPUTER SYSTEMS:
20081
hacker to remotely execute malicious code in a target computer. The next
subsection describes how an attacker can exploit a buffer overflow
vulnerability to achieve this objective.
2. Exploitation of a Buffer Overflow
A computer program consists of a set of instructions and a set of data
on which the instructions operate. In the case of the common login
procedure, for instance, the data consist of the user-provided identification
name and password. The instructions of the login program parse the input
data, and authenticate the stated identity of the user by validating the
password, provided the password and identity match. When its identity is
authenticated, the user is allowed to access the system.
A program occupies a memory buffer consisting of a text segment and
a stack segment. The text segment contains the program instructions, and
the stack contains data.109 A final instruction in the buffer contains the
return address, which specifies the instruction to be executed next.
A program such as the login procedure that accepts external input is a
possible entry point for an attacker's malicious code. °  Instead of
providing a valid user name, an attacker could enter characters representing
malicious code. The computer would read the attacker's input into the
stack segment in order to determine its validity. The attacker has at this
point injected his malicious code into a memory buffer allocated to the
currently active program, the login procedure. The attacker now needs to
instruct the computer to execute the (malicious) contents of the buffer.
A carefully crafted attack strategy would not only fill the stack with
malicious code, but also, overflow the stack and overwrite the adjacent
return address. The return address contains an instruction pointer that
A PROGRAMMER'S PERSPECTIVE, 593 (2003). A core dump is the recorded state of the working
memory of a computer program at a specific time, generally when the program has terminated
abnormally (crashed). In practice, other key pieces of program state are usually dumped at the
same time, including the processor registers, which may include the program counter and stack
pointer, memory management information, and other processor and operating system flags and
information. The name comes from the once-standard memory technology core memory. Core
dumps are often used to diagnose or debug errors in computer programs. On many operating
systems, a fatal error in a program automatically triggers a core dump, and by extension the
phrase "to dump core" has come to mean, in many cases, any fatal error, regardless of whether a
record of the program memory is created. The term is used in jargon to indicate any circumstance
where large amounts of unedited data are deposited for further examination.
109. In the case of a login program, the text segment contains the instructions that examine a
user's input to determine its validity. The stack segment stores the user input.
110. See SZOR, supra note 22, at 413 ("Computer worms typically attack service processes
and daemon programs that are waiting to handle incoming requests by listening on various
TCP/UDP ports. Any such communication service could potentially contain flaws, as did the
fingerd (in the case of the Moms worm), the BIND (in the case of the ADM worm), and the
Microsoft IIS (in the case of the CodeRed worm).").
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defines the next instruction to be executed. By overwriting this pointer
with the address of the stack segment, the attacker can instruct the
computer to execute the malicious content of the stack.
The attacker has now injected malicious code into memory and
ensured that control will pass to the malicious code. Furthermore, the
attacker has also ensured that the code will execute at the privilege level of
the running program. If, for instance, the running program has control over
confidential information, such as passwords and financial data, the
malicious code will have the same privilege.
In summary, the most basic elements of a buffer overflow attack are as
follows: (1) data are copied into the buffer, (2) the data overflows the
buffer, (3) the overflow data overwrites the original procedure return
address, (4) the new return address now points to the new data in the
buffer, which may include malevolent instructions, and (5) these
instructions trigger execution of the virus. "1
Schematically, this process works as illustrated below:
1 2
BASIC BUFFER OVERFLOW MECHANISM
INPUT DATA 10
1. Data are copied into
BUFFER the buffer as normal
5. CPU instructions in
buffer trigger execution
of viral code 2. Data overflow buffer
3. Overflow data overwrite
original procedure
LOCAL return address
4. New return address VARIABLES
points to data in
buffer, which are RETURN
viral CPU instructions ADDRESS
111. This section has described the classic buffer overflow exploit mechanism. Buffer
overflow exploits come in many varieties. See SZOR, supra note 22, at Chapter 10, 365-421.
112. The diagram is adapted from ROB ENDERLE AND JASMINE NOEL, THE NEW APPROACH
TO WINDOWS SECURITY 7 (2004), available at http://globalwatchtech.com/resources/
NewApproach to PC SecurityFinal_(2).pdf.
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V. The Duty to Safeguard Confidential Information
Cyber intruders may be subject to criminal113 and civil liability." 4
Victims may recover damages from attackers under common law tort," 5 as
well as under the civil liability provisions of the federal Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act.' 16 Hackers, however, are often judgment-proof because it
is difficult to identify them and to subject them to jurisdiction.' 7 For these
reasons, database owners, such as deep-pocketed financial institutions or
medical service providers who negligently fail to prevent an attack, are
usually the preferred targets for civil lawsuits. 1 8  Whether a database.
owner is liable under tort depends on whether he owes a legal duty of care
to safeguard the date contained in the database. Such a duty may be
imposed by statute or by common law tort principles. 
119
A. Statutory Duty of Care
A statute may impose a duty to exercise due care on a database owner
to protect data from intruders, either expressly, 120 or implicitly through
113. See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND THE LAW: AN
OVERVIEW OF KEY ISSUES 37-39 (Stewart D. Personick & Cynthia A. Patterson eds., 2003),
available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn-030908878X. See generally Brent Wible, A
Site Where Hackers are Welcome: Using Hack-In Contests to Shape Preferences and Deter
Computer Crime, 112 YALE L.J. 1577, 1581-85 (2003).
114. See Robin A. Brooks, Deterring the Spread of Viruses Online: Can Tort Law Tighten
the Net?, 17 REV. OF LITIG. 343 (1998); Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement of Cybercrime
on the Electronic Frontier, 11 S. CAL. INDERDISC. L.J. 63, 66 (2001) (stating that tort remedies
"will play an increasingly important role in punishing and deterring fraud, hacking, and other
wrongdoing on the Internet).
115. See generally Brooks, supra note 114; de Villiers, supra note 33, at 123 (an analysis of
common law tort principles, including damages, in the information security context); Meiring de
Villiers, Virus ex Machina Res Ipsa Loquitur, 1 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2003) (quantitative
analysis of circumstantial evidence of negligent virus transmission).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2000) (allowing civil action against violator "to obtain
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief").
117. See de Villiers, supra note 12, at § 4(A)
118. See id. (an analysis of civil liability for enablement of cyber crime and tort); W. REID
WITTLIFF, COMPUTER HACKING AND LIABILITY ISSUES: WHEN DOES LIABILITY ATTACH? 11,
available at http://www.gdhm.com/pdf/wrw-hackarticle.pdf (Discussing tort theories that may
be utilized to recover damages from defendants whose negligence enabled a cyber attack.).
119. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 2, at 261-68; de Villiers, supra note 33, at 123; Henderson
& Yarbrough, supra note 103, at 11; Sarah Faulkner, Comment, Invasion of the Information
Snatchers: Creating Liability for Corporations with Vulnerable Computer Networks, 18 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. LAW 1019 (2000); W. Reid Wittliff, supra note 118.
120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005)
(discussing express and implied statutory causes of action).
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legal precedent. 121 California's Security Breach Information Act (SBIA),1
22
for instance, expressly creates a civil cause of action against a person or
entity who fails to protect customers' personal information.' 23  It also
provides that aggrieved customers may recover damages for the
defendant's breach of that duty. 124  The relevant provision states, "[a]
business that owns or licenses personal information about a California
resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and
practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the
personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use,
modification, or disclosure."' 125  The legislation further provides, "[a]ny
customer injured by a violation of this title may institute a civil action to
recover damages."'
126
The civil cause of action created by the SBIA is rooted in negligence
principles, because the duty it imposes is based on reasonableness. The
statute requires, for instance, implementation of "reasonable security
procedures and practices"' 127 that are "appropriate to the nature of the
information."' 128  The essence of the standard of care imposed by
negligence law is reasonableness and the duty to act as a reasonable person
would under the circumstances. 129 Negligence is generally described as
conduct "which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm."'' 30  Professors
Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig comment that, "[a]lthough
courts vary in what impact a statutory violation has on the adjudication of
negligence, they may employ civil statutes to set standards in negligent
121. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 305-06
(3d ed., 2005) ("In the one case, the court is saying that the legislation sets the standard because
the legislature implicitly intended it to do so, and in the other case, the court acknowledges that
the statute sets the standard because the court thinks that it is a good idea. Either way, if the
statute does not expressly create a cause of action, the essential inquiry is the same: was the law
intended to protect this class of persons from this type of harm.").
122. Cal. Civ. Code §1798.81 et. seq. (West Supp. 2005).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at §1798.81.5.
126. Id. at §1798.84(b).
127. Id.
128. Id. at §1798.81.5(c).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965.)
130. See Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 249 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (stating that negligence "is
generally described as behavior that creates unreasonable foreseeable risks of injury"). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 282 (1965); PROSSER & KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON
OT THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (5th ed., 1984).
2008]
enablement lawsuits. An unexcused violation of a statute requiring
reasonable security is itself negligence, that is, negligence per se."''
B. Common Law Tort
Common law tort principles may also impose on a database owner a
duty to safeguard information from intruders. 132 A person whose private
information has been compromised may pursue a civil action under a
theory of negligence for this harm, which is the most widely used theory of
liability in the law of torts.' 33
Negligence is generally defined as a breach of the duty not to impose
an unreasonable risk on society. 34  It applies to any risk that can be
characterized as unreasonable, including risks associated with information
security breaches. A victim of an information security breach may
therefore bring legal action under a negligence theory against anyone who
contributed to the risks associated with the breach, including those who
failed in their duty to reduce or eliminate the risk. 1
35
The plaintiff in a negligence action has to prove the following
elements to establish her claim: (1) the existence of a legal duty on the part
of the defendant not to expose the plaintiff to unreasonable risks, (2) a
breach of the duty, namely a failure on the part of the defendant to conform
to the norm of reasonableness, (3) a causal connection between defendant's
conduct and plaintiffs harm,' 36 and (4) actual damage to the plaintiff
resulting from the defendant's negligence.
131. Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of
Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1592. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 285, cmt. c ("Even where a legislative enactment contains no express provision that its violation
shall result in tort liability, and no implication to that effect, the court may, and in certain types of
classes customarily will, adopt the requirements of the enactment as the standard of conduct
necessary to avoid liability for negligence. The same is true of municipal ordinances and
administrative regulations."). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 12 (Discussion Draft,
1999) ("An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is designed to
protect against the type of accident the actor's conduct causes, and if the accident victim is within
the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.").
132. Mark J. Maier, Backdoor Liability from Internet Telecommuters, 6 COMP L. REV. &
TECH. J. 27, 55 (2001).
133. See James A. Henderson, Why Negligence Law Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377
(2003); Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L.
REV. 963 (1981); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of Modern American
Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992).
134. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 130, at § 31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §
282 (describing negligence as conduct "which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm").
135. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, 258 (2005) (The plaintiff can assert that any
conduct counts as negligence.).
136. This element includes actual as well as proximate cause. Defendant's negligence is the
actual cause of the plaintiffs harm if, but for the negligence, the harm would not have occurred.
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Multiple lawsuits, including class actions, have been filed against
database possessors for enabling cyber intrusions that resulted in
compromise of confidential information.' 37 In June 2005, CardSystems,
Inc., a credit card processor, publicly acknowledged that hackers had
illegally accessed its credit card database.' 38 A class of 40 million plaintiffs
promptly filed a class action suit 139 alleging that CardSystems had failed to
adequately protect sensitive information from unauthorized access. 140
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") regularly brings lawsuits
against companies for enabling theft of confidential customer information
by failing to patch foreseeably exploitable vulnerabilities.141 The FTC's
authority to enforce information security practices derives from Section 5
of the FTC Act, 142 which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and
the FTC's Gramm-Leach-Bliley Safeguards Rule.
143
In its lawsuit against the clothing manufacturer Guess?, the FTC
alleged that the company had breached its promise to safeguard the
confidentiality of customer information collected through its Web site.1
4
4
According to allegations in the FTC complaint, the Guess? Web site had
been vulnerable to reasonably foreseeable attacks from intruders seeking
access to confidential customer information.1 45 In particular, Guess? had
allegedly failed to patch a security vulnerability that made the site
146susceptible to SQL injection attacks by the SQL Slammer worm.
According to the FTC complaint, the fast-spreading Slammer foreseeably
exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability in several Microsoft products,
The proximate causation element requires the defendant's conduct to be reasonably related to the
plaintiff's harm.
137. See, e.g., Harrington v. Choicepoint, Inc., No. CV05 1294 SJO (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 22,
2005); Parke v. Cardsystems Solutions, Inc., No. CGC-05-442624 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed June 27,
2005), available at http://www.techfirm.com/cardsystems.pdf..
138. See Jonathan Krim and Michael Barbaro, 40 Million Credit Card Numbers Hacked.
Data Breached at Processing Center, WASH. POST, June 18, 2005, at AO1.
139. Parke, No. CGC-05-442624.
140. Id. at 2, 5, 12, 19-20, 23, and 25.
141. See Beales, supra note 2, at 20 (when companies promise security, "they have a legal
obligation to take reasonable and appropriate steps to guard against reasonably anticipated
vulnerabilities").
142. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006)
143. 16 C.F.R. § 314.1-314.5 (2008).
144. In the Matter of GUESS?, Inc. and GUESS.com, Inc. Docket No. C-4091 (C.D. Cal.
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/06/guesscmp.htm [hereinafter Guess?
Complaint].
145. Id.
146. Id. For details on the Slammer worm, see David Moore et al., Inside the Slammer
Worm, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, July/August 2003, at 33.
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including Microsoft's SQL server, 147 resulting in access to a Guess?
customer database containing 191,000 credit card numbers. 148 The FTC
complaint further alleged that Guess? had been aware of the vulnerabilities
since October 2000, that the stolen information was sensitive, and that the
fix was relatively inexpensive.149 The case settled in June 2003.150
In an administrative proceeding decided by the Maine Public Utilities
Commission ("MPUC"), the telecommunications company Verizon applied
for a waiver of wholesale performance metrics. 151 Verizon pleaded that it
had failed to meet its performance standards because the SQL Slammer
worm had attacked its servers. 52  The MPUC rejected Verizon's
arguments, concluding that the telecommunications company had acted
unreasonably by failing to apply a security patch issued six months earlier
by Microsoft. 153 The MPUC reasoned that cyber attacks by viruses and
worms, such as those experienced by Verizon, were foreseeable, and that
Microsoft had made patches available for vulnerabilities in their products,
including the vulnerability specifically exploited by Slammer. 5 4  The
MPUC noted that companies such as AT&T and WorldCom had installed
the Microsoft patches, and consequently escaped the Slammer attacks. 155
147. See Vulnerability Note, US-CERT, Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Contains Heap Buffer
Overflow in SQL Server Resolution Service, VU#399260, http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls
/id/399260.
148. Guess? Complaint, at 3-4.
149. Id. at 3.
150. Press Release, FTC, Guess Settles FTC Security Charges: Third FTC Case Targets
Claims about Information Security, (June 18, 2003), available at http://www.flc.gov/opa/2003
/06/guess.htm (last modified June 25, 2007). See generally STEWART BAKER AND MAURY
SHENK, A PATCH IN TIME SAVES NINE: LIABILITY RISKS FOR UNPATCHED SOFTWARE, (2003),
available at www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/631 .pdf.
151. In re Verizon Related Reduction Claim, Me Pub. Util. Comm'n, Docket No. 2000-849
(April 30, 2003).
152. Inquiry Regarding the Entry of Verizon-Maine Into the InterLATA Telephone Market
Pursuant To Section 271 of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Maine Pub. Util., Dkt. No. 2000-
849 (Apr. 30, 2003) (Order).
153. Id.
154. Id. See generally, Welcome to CERT, http://www.cert.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2008);
SANS Institute - SANS Top-20 Security Risks 92007 Annual Update),
http://www.sans.org/top20.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
155. In re Verizon Related Reduction Claim, Docket No. 2000-849. See also Citron, supra
note 2, at 256, n.82 (discussing other information security breach cases pursued by the FTC
during 2005-06).
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C. Foreseeability
Foreseeability is a crucial concept in negligence law.1 56 Foreseeability
defines whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, 57 whether the
defendant breached a duty,158  and whether the defendant's breach
proximately caused the plaintiffs injury.159  A person who commits an
affirmative act that creates a risk of harm, for instance, owes a duty of care
to everyone foreseeably within the scope of the risk. 160 Courts have denied
a duty based on absence of foreseeability, even where the defendant's
conduct created a risk of harm.'
6'
Courts require a plaintiff to prove breach of duty in a negligence
action by identifying an untaken precaution, and showing that the
precaution would have yielded greater benefits in risk reduction than its
cost. 62  The role of the untaken precaution in negligence law is well
156. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 130, at § 43 (discussing foreseeability in
torts). See also W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV.. 921, 921-922
(2005) ("The concept of foreseeability is fast devouring the negligence cause of action.
Foreseeability of a risk of injury has for centuries rested at the heart of court determinations of
whether a defendant breached its duty of care. More recently, foreseeability of a particular
plaintiff's injury has become central to the element of proximate cause. Foreseeability's most
aggressive advance of late, however, has been into the realm of duty.").
157. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial
Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REv. 739, 755 (2005) (Section
2. "Duty and Foreseeability"); Cardi, supra note 156, at 921, 923 ("Foreseeability remains a
pervasive consideration in many courts' duty analyses.").
158. See Cardi, supra note 156, at 921 ("Foreseeability of a risk has for centuries rested at the
heart of court determinations of whether a defendant breached its duty of care."). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 4 (Discussion Draft 1999) ("Primary factors to consider in
ascertaining whether conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that it will
result in harm, the foreseeable severity of the harm that may ensue, and the burden that would be
borne by the actor and others if the actor takes precautions that eliminate or reduce the possibility
of harm.").
159. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 130, at § 43. See also Mark F. Grady, Proximate
Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REv. 293, 323 (2002).
160. See, e.g., Brennen v. Docusearch, Inc., 591 P.2d 719, 723 (Or. 1979) (stating that a duty
is created where the defendant "created a foreseeable risk of harm to others"); Greater Houston
Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990) ("In determining whether the defendant
was under a duty, the court will consider several interrelated factors, including the risk,
foreseeability, and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the actor's conduct,
the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing the
burden on the defendant. Of all these factors, foreseeability of the risk is the foremost and
dominant consideration.").
161. See, e.g., Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181, 187 (N.M. 2003). See also Cardi,
supra note 156, at 930 ("Foreseeability has become so central a concept in many courts' duty
analyses that a ruling on foreseeability is outcome-determinative.").
162. Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 146 (1989). See also
Cardi, supra note 156, at 925 (the breach calculus turns on (1) "the foreseeable likelihood that the
defendant's actions might result in injury", (2) the severity the range of foreseeable injuries, and
(3) the cost of available precautions that would have prevented the injury).
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illustrated in Cooley v. Public Service Co. 16 3  In Cooley, the plaintiff
suffered harm from a loud noise over a telephone wire. She suggested that
the defendant could have taken two untaken precautions to prevent the
harm: (1) strategically positioned a wire mesh basket on the wires and (2)
insulated the wires. 164  The court ruled that neither untaken precaution
constituted a breach of duty.' 65 Both precautions would have increased the
risk of electrocution to passersby sufficiently to outweigh the benefits in
harm reduction. Any foreseeable risk can be included in the cost-benefit
calculation, as long as it would have been reduced by the untaken
166precaution.
The proximate cause doctrine limits the plaintiffs recovery to harm
reasonably related to the defendant's wrongdoing. 167 Foreseeability plays a
central role in proximate cause.' 68  Professor Jonathan Cardi has
commented on the role of foreseeability, stating "[A] plaintiff may fail to
survive the proximate cause inquiry where the defendant's actions resulted
in (1) an unforeseeable type of injury, (2) an injury occurring in an
unforeseeable manner, or (3) injury to an unforeseeable plaintiff."'
' 69
D. Legal Meaning of Foreseeability
An event is the foreseeable result of an action if the action ex ante
systematically increased the likelihood of the event. This would be the case
if the action either created the risk of the event or increased the likelihood
of its materialization.' 70 In Bunting v. Hogsett,171 for instance, the driver of
a dinky train negligently failed to pay proper attention upon approaching a
railroad intersection and collided with a passenger train at the intersection.
Injured passengers on the passenger train filed suit against the owner of the
dinky line. The court found the driver of the dinky train was negligent in
163. 10 A.2d 673 (N.H. 1940).
164. Id at 675.
165. Id. at 6 76 .
166. Grady, supra note 162, at 146.
167. See DOBBS, supra note 135, at 444.
168. See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN AND ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES
399 (7th ed. 2001). See generally Grady, supra note 162.
169. Cardi, supra note 157, at 749.
170. See Grady, supra note 162, at 323 (stating plaintiff must show that the untaken
precaution would have reduced the risk of the accident at issue. If not, the plaintiff fails on
proximate cause grounds). See also Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the
Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 97 (Gerald Postema, ed., 2001)
(reasonable foreseeability is "a function of two separate effects: (1) the objective probability of an
event occurring, and (2) a reasonable person's knowledge and beliefs about that probability."); Id.
at 98 (explaining that proximate causation views the plaintiff's harm "from the standpoint of an
appropriately general description of the risk created by the defendant.").
171. 21 A. 31 (Pa. 1891).
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failing to keep a proper lookout. The dinky engineer's failure to look out
for the passenger train created the exact risk that caused the plaintiffs
injuries, namely the risk of a collision.
172
The basic test of foreseeability in negligence law can also be described
as "whether one can see a systematic relationship between the type of
accident that the plaintiff suffered" and the defendant's action. 173  An
illustration of foreseeability as a systematic causal relation is found in
O'Malley v. Laurel Line Bus Co.174  In O'Malley, the defendant's bus
driver let a passenger off in the middle of a street instead of at the regular
bus stop. It was a dark and stormy night so that the passenger did not
realize where he was being let off. The court held the defendant liable for
injuries sustained when a car struck the passenger. There is a systematic
causal relationship between letting people off in the middle of a street
under such conditions that they cannot ascertain the risks of dangerous
traffic, and their being struck by a passing car.
Coincidental harm is not foreseeable. Suppose, for instance, a
defendant negligently exceeds the speed limit and arrives at a spot just in
time to be struck by a falling tree. Although a plaintiff such as an injured
passenger may argue credibly that falling trees are foreseeable, the accident
is likely outside the scope of the risk created by the defendant's speeding.
The defendant's speeding created risks of traffic accidents, but it neither
created the risk that materialized nor made it more likely. The accident
was therefore not within the scope of foreseeable risk created by the
defendant's conduct. The accident was coincidental and not systematically
related to the defendant's negligence, and was hence, unforeseeable. The
outcome would likely have been different if, instead, a tree had fallen in
front of the speeding driver, and the car crashed into it. If it can be shown
that the accident could have been avoided had the driver traveled at a
reasonable speed, then the speeding driver's negligence may have been a
proximate cause of the accident. Failure to stop within a short time
window is a foreseeable risk of speeding.'
75
Foreseeability is not necessarily a reflection of the objective
probability of an event, but rather, is a reflection of what a reasonable
person would foresee under the circumstances. 176 This degree of foresight
may be equal to the objective probability of the event, or it may be a
172. Id. at 31. The case is much more interesting than this brief description reveals. See
Grady, supra note 159, at 304-05 (discussing case in more detail).
173. See Grady, supra note 159, at 323.
174. 166 A. 868 (Pa. 1933).
175. See Berry v. Borough of Sugar Notch, 191 Pa. 345 (1899). See also Grady, supra note
159, at 324.
176. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 94 (1999).
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fraction thereof.'77 This fraction may be zero if the defendant is reasonably
ignorant of the systematic relationship between her act and a plaintiffs
injury. The "Reasonable Ignorance of the Relationship" doctrine, proposed
by Professor Mark Grady, formalizes this scenario.178 Under this doctrine,
the defendant's liability is cut off when, even though in hindsight there is
clearly a systematic relationship between the defendant's untaken
precaution and the plaintiffs harm, scientists would not have predicted the
relationship. The following case illustrates the doctrine.
In Doughty v. Turner Manufacturing Co.,' 79 foreseeability turned on
scientific state of the art. A worker negligently knocked the cover of a vat
containing molten sodium cyanide into the molten liquid in the vat. The
plaintiffs were injured when a chemical reaction between the molten
sodium cyanide and the cover, which was made of a combination of
asbestos and cement, known as sindayo, caused an eruption. The risk that
the cover might splash the molten liquid onto someone was known and
foreseeable, but the chemical reaction that actually caused the harm was
unknown and unpredictable at the time of the accident. Scientists later
demonstrated that at sufficiently high temperatures the sindayo compound
would undergo a chemical change which creates steam. It was steam
created in this manner that caused the eruption that injured the plaintiff in
Doughty. None of this was known at the time of the accident. The court
therefore held for the defendant, stating that the defendant was reasonably
ignorant of the chemical reaction that caused the injuries.18° The defendant
thus escaped liability under the Reasonable Ignorance doctrine.
VI. Reasonable Foreseeability in Information Security
A. Common Law Background
This article focuses on situations where a database owner fails to patch
a security vulnerability, thereby paving the way for a cyber attacker to
obtain unauthorized access to confidential information. Professor Robert
Rabin has termed wrongdoing of this kind an "enabling tort."'' An
enabling tort is a negligent act by a primary tortfeasor that sets the stage for
177. See Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 322 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) ("foreseeability is
often referred to as epistemic (or knowable) probability.").
178. See Grady, supra note 159, at 328.
179. [1964] 1 Q.B. 518.
180. Id., at 520, 525.
181. See generally Rabin, supra note 8.
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an intervening tortfeasor to commit a tort or crime. 82 A construction
worker may, for instance, negligently leave an unattended scaffold beside
an open window, which enables a burglar to obtain access to valuables
inside the building.
183
Professor Mark Grady has developed a theory explaining that a
primary tortfeasor's liability will be preserved for conduct that foreseeably
encouraged intervening tortfeasors who are so-called "free radicals."' 84
Free radicals are individuals who are not deterred by the threat of liability
because they are judgment-proof, anonymous, immature, or strongly
motivated by ideological considerations. Free radicals include persons
such as mentally incompetent people, terrorists, and criminals.'85 The free
radical doctrine recognizes that the prospect of negligence liability is
ineffective against defendants who are shielded from, or otherwise
undeterred by, the prospect of liability. The deterrence rationale of
negligence law would be defeated if responsible people who encourage free
radicals were allowed to escape judgment by shifting liability to
undeterrable individuals. Common law negligence rules therefore impose
liability on a primary tortfeasor, even when intentional or criminal behavior
by a free radical intervenes. 86  Research has shown that cyber rogues
generally fit the profile of free radicals.
87
"Reasonable foreseeability" is an essential element of enabling torts.
An intervening tortfeasor's behavior must have been foreseeable before the
primary tortfeasor can be held liable for enabling the intervening tort or
crime. 188  This article now turns to an analysis of factors that have
convinced courts of the existence of the requisite foreseeability in enabling
tort cases.
182. See Rabin, supra note 8, at 437 ("Beyond the immediate perpetrator of harm, the victim
perceives the individual, or more often, the enterprise, that set the stage for the suffering that
unfolded. The Enabler.").
183. See Stansbie v. Troman, [1948] 2 K.B. 48.
184. See Grady, supra note 10, at 189. See also Rabin, supra note 8, at 439 ("The key factor
counseling liability ...is that defendant paved the way for a truly reckless individual to be
imposing serious risks of injury on the public at large.").
185. See Grady, supra note 10, at 191.
186. See Grady, supra note 10, at 196 ("When the encouraged people predictably lack
exposure to tort law deterrence, the courts have concluded that more responsible people should be
deterred from encouraging them."). See also Rabin, supra note 8, at 444. ("The main deterrence
gap is the inability to effectively reach the putative wrongdoer himself, either through criminal or
tort sanctions. This is the crux of the matter and the link to creating responsibility for enabling
behavior.").
187. See generally de Villiers, supra note 12.
188. See Grady, supra note 10, at 447. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17
(Discussion Draft 1999) ("The conduct of a defendant can lack reasonable care insofar as it can
foreseeably combine with or bring about the improper conduct of the plaintiff or a third party.").
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1. Scarce Opportunity
Courts are more likely to impose liability when the defendant has
created a tempting or "scarce" opportunity that does not exist for the
intervening tortfeasor in the "normal background of incitements and
opportunities."1"9 A scarce opportunity is one that meets a wrongdoer's
objectives when he has few, if any equivalent, alternative opportunities
conveniently available to him.
In Sun Trust Banks, Inc. v. Killebrew,'90 appellee Stephen Killebrew
was shot by a robber on Sun Trust Bank's premises after using an
automated teller machine at night. Killebrew sued Sun Trust for failing to
exercise due care to keep its premises safe in light of a prior similar
criminal incident. The prior incident was reported to the police but not to
the bank. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sun Trust,
but was reversed on appeal. Sun Trust appealed to the Supreme Court of
Georgia. 9'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Sears concluded that, even absent
evidence of prior criminal activity, Sun Trust should have foreseen criminal
activity at its ATMs because of the unique opportunity for criminal activity
they present. Justice Sears referred to studies by the banking industry
suggesting that ATMs are reliable sources of funds not only for bank
189. See Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 130 (1985) (imposing duty to
protect against criminal acts, stating "defendants may be said to have created 'an especial
temptation and opportunity for criminal misconduct."' (quoting Gomez v. Ticor, 145 Cal. App.
3d 622, 628 (1983))); Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 640 (1997) (emphasizing that
the unique nature of the parking complex in which the plaintiff was assaulted invited such acts);;
Spitzak v. Hylands, Ltd., 500 N.W.2d 154, 156-57 (Minn. App. 1993) (declining to impose
liability on landlord where building neither exposed tenants to unusual risks, nor presented a
unique opportunity for criminal activity); Grady, supra note 159, at 310. See also Michael J.
Yelnosky, Comment, Business Inviter 's Duty to Protect Invitees From Criminal Acts, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 883, 891 (1986) (noting that "courts frequently state that a duty to protect arises if a
business provides a 'unique climate for crime."').
190. 464 S.E.2d 207 (Ga. 1995).
191. The Court was presented with the issue of "whether a prior crime that was unreported
and unknown to a property owner, but was reported to the police, was sufficient to give the
property owner knowledge of a risk of criminal activity on its property so as to require it to take
reasonable precautions to protect customers from similar risks." Id. at 207. The Court held that
the criminal incident did not create actual or constructive knowledge of the risk of criminal
activity on the part of the defendant. It held further, that no evidence was presented that
established the existence of a duty on the property owner to "search police records for reports of
criminal activity on its premises." In his concurring opinion, Justice Sears concluded that a jury
question nevertheless remained regarding whether Sun Trust reasonably could have foreseen the
risk of a robbery on its premises, on grounds other than the prior incident. Justice Sears
concluded that, even absent evidence of prior criminal activity, Sun Trust should have foreseen
criminal activity at its ATMs because of the unique opportunity for criminal activity presented by
automated teller machines.
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customers, but also, for criminals.' 92 A criminal can generally not be
certain whether a person or premises he is attempting to rob is carrying any
money, but a customer who has withdrawn money from an ATM is a
guaranteed source of cash.' 93 Automated teller machines, therefore, present
a scarce opportunity to robbers, because ATMs are weakly secured and
their patrons guaranteed to have money.
194
In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co.,'9 5 inmates who had been
sentenced to working in a boot camp for juvenile offenders were working
under supervision of three Home Office guards. One evening, in breach of
their instructions to watch the delinquents, the guards simply went to bed,
leaving the inmates unsupervised. The inmates swam out to an unattended
yacht moored nearby and managed to set it in motion. They collided with
another yacht owned by the plaintiffs, who sued the Home Office for the
resulting damage. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and the
Court of Appeal affirmed.'96
The defendants' liability turned on the foreseeability of the
delinquents' behavior.'9 7 Several factors made exploitation of the escape
opportunity foreseeable. The inmates were juvenile offenders with records
including convictions for breaking and entering, larceny, and grand theft
auto. Five of the seven had a record of previous escapes from boot camp,
and they likely were biding their time for another chance to break out. The
escape opportunity was easy to exploit due to the total absence of
supervision. It was also a scarce opportunity. Under normal
circumstances, the only realistic way out for the inmates would be for them
to physically incapacitate the guards or break out surreptitiously, both of
which are more complicated operations.
If, unlike the situation in Dorset Yacht, a wrongdoer already has
several equally attractive opportunities available for harmful behavior, the
defendant's encouragement likely does not amount to a scarce opportunity.
192. See generally Richard E. Vogel, Note, Institutional Liability for Attacks on ATM
Patrons, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1009 (1994). See also Yelnosky, supra note 189, at 886
("Commercial crime is more prevalent than household and personal victimization, and crime rate
for retail stores and proprietary structures is higher than for other businesses. The parking lot
seems to present unique opportunities for crime. Customers are typically in possession of money
and recently purchased items. In this respect, the would-be assailant in search of valuable(s) need
not take a chance on the unknown assets of some passerby.").
193. See Daniel J. Smith, Liability of Bank For Criminal Attack at ATM or Night Depository,
in AM. JUtR. 3d Proof of Facts § 5, at 514 (1989).
194 See Vogel, supra note 192, at 1010 (in light of the fear of ATM crime "and the danger
presented by the combination of money, nighttime, and lax security, banks need to consider
means of protecting the users of their money machines.").
195. [1970] 2 A.C. 1004 (appeal taken from Eng.)
196. Id., at 1005.
197. Id., at 1008-1010.
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In Gonsalez v. Derrington9 8 for instance, the defendant sold five gallons of
gasoline in an open pail to a customer in violation of a municipal ordinance
that prohibited sales of gasoline in open containers and in excess of two
gallons. The purchaser subsequently used the gasoline to commit arson.
The court declined to impose liability on the defendant for enabling the
crime. Providing the gasoline to the arsonist did not constitute a rare
opportunity, as he could have siphoned the gasoline he needed from a car,
or bought it piecemeal. 99
In Segerman v. Jones,"°° a school teacher leaving normal school
children unsupervised for few minutes was considered insufficient
encouragement hold her liable for mischief that occurred during her
absence. Similar cases have denied liability for leaving a stake at a
construction site,"' for leaving a screwdriver out in a yard, 0 2 and for
leaving a load of dirt clods out in a backyard. 23 The courts apparently did
not consider these opportunities to be particularly scarce, and hence not
foreseeably exploitable. A rogue intent on harming another does not have
to wait for a pile of dirt clods or a screwdriver to become available.
2. Unauthenticated Access
Valuable property is usually secured by measures that require
authentication, such as through a valid key, an access card, or proof of
identity. Lawsuits are frequently brought against primary tortfeasors who
provide criminals with unauthenticated access to a secured location. In
Stansbie v Troman2° for instance, the defendant, an interior decorator,
neglected to lock the door of the house of a client. A burglar entered
through the open door and stole the plaintiff's jewelry. The court held the
defendant liable for the loss. The defendant had provided the burglar with
unauthenticated access-valuables are normally kept under lock and key.205
198. 363 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1961).
199. See Grady, supra note 10, at 211-13 ("Often the best way to see whether a defendant has
encouraged free radicals is look at the world from their perspective. Has the defendant created
some tempting opportunity that does not normally exist for them?").
200. 259 A.2d 794 (Md. 1970).
201. Cole v. Hous. Auth., 385 N.E.2d 382 (Ill. 1979).
202. Dennis ex rel. Evans v Timmons, 437 S.E.2d 138 ( S.C. 1993).
203. Donehue v. Duvall, 243 N.E.2d 222 (Ill. 1969). The defendants had hauled loads of dirt
into their backyard. Children from the neighborhood frequented the pile and threw clods of dirt at
each other, and the defendants knew about this. One of the children threw a dirt clod at the five-
year old defendant, and injured his eye. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed.
204. [1948] 2 K.B. 48.
205. See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 130, at 203 (stating that it is foreseeable that
valuable property will be stolen if left unguarded and in public view) (incl cases cite at note 2).
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In a roughly similar case,2"6 the defendant put a scaffold in place next
to the plaintiffs apartment building. Armed robbers used the scaffold to
gain entry to the plaintiffs apartment and stole his goods. The New York
Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for summary judgment.2"7
The defendant encouraged wrongdoers by providing a tempting, and
therefore, foreseeably exploitable opportunity. In an analogous case
involving information security, the bookseller Barnes and Noble allegedly
permitted cyber rogues to gain unauthorized access to confidential client
information through security vulnerabilities in its website. Barnes and
Noble entered into a settlement with the New York Attorney General in
April 2004.208
Situations such as an unlocked door, strategically positioned scaffold,
or electronic access, are valuable opportunities to a criminal, because they
enable a level of access that normally requires authentication. The
opportunity also lowers a wrongdoer's transaction cost. A thief can use
brute force to break into a house, but exploiting an unlocked door or
conveniently placed scaffold requires less physical exertion, produces
faster results, and is less likely to attract attention than a more forceful
entry.
3. Access Complexity
Opportunities that provide wrongdoers with basic access to valuables,
but that leave significant remaining barriers, are less attractive, and thus
less foreseeably exploitable than opportunities without such barriers.
Courts and scholars classify opportunities of the former kind as ones
having significant "access complexity. '" 20 9  An enabling opportunity
exhibits high access complexity when it is exploitable only during a narrow
time frame, when its successful exploitation requires specific fortuitous
circumstances, or when it requires "cooperation" from the victim.
210
Consider, for example, a conveniently positioned scaffold by an open
window which provides access to a room containing valuables locked in a
vault. The scaffold provides a burglar with basic access to the room, but
the locked vault is a significant remaining barrier to the burglar's target, the
206. Russo v. Grace Institute, 546 N.Y.S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
207. Id. at 510.
208. See Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Attorney General
reaches Agreement with Barnes and Noble on Privacy and Security Standard, April 29, 2004,
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/apr/apr29a_04.html.
209. The term is borrowed from computer science literature. See, e.g., Mell, Scarfone, &
Romanosky, supra note 19, at 86.
210. See id.
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valuables. The scaffold is therefore an opportunity with high access
complexity.
Access complexity plays a role in so-called "key in ignition cases."
In these cases, a defendant typically leaves the key in the ignition of an
unlocked car. The car is stolen, the thief's negligent or reckless driving
injures the plaintiff, and the plaintiff sues the defendant for negligently
enabling the crime that injured her. Courts have declined to impose
liability in the absence of special circumstances that made intermeddling by
a thief foreseeable.2 1 Commenting on the evolved rule governing the key-
in-car issue in California, Professor Mark Grady states, "[l]eaving the keys
in unusually dangerous or difficult-to-manage vehicles will yield liability if
they are parked under circumstances that make theft or meddling
probable.,
212
In Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners,23 a case where a truck had
been left parked overnight in a dangerous neighborhood with the key in the
ignition, the court found special circumstances that made intermeddling
foreseeable. The court imposed a duty on the defendant based on several
factors, including the fact that free radical alcoholics and derelicts
frequented the neighborhood, that the truck had been parked in the location
for a relatively long period of time, that the truck was large, and that it was
difficult to control.214 The fact that the vehicle was left unlocked provided
unauthenticated access to the vehicle, and the significant time window of
opportunity provided low access complexity. If, in contrast, the key had
been left unattended only momentarily while the owner ran a quick errand,
the case may have been decided in favor of the defendant.
In Richardson v. Ham,215 the defendants were engaged in construction
work in San Diego County. In their earth-moving operations they used two
26-ton Allis-Chalmers bulldozers. The bulldozers could be started if a
person pushed a compression lever in and stepped on the starter. The
machines could be started in gear, in which case they would commence to
move as soon as the engine started.216
211. See, e.g., Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1954) (finding for the defendant,
holding that absent special circumstances, the owner of an automobile does not owe a duty to
remove the ignition key to protect other motorists from the negligent driving of a thief).
212. See Grady, supra note 10, at 199; Rabin, supra note 8, at 440 ("Some states that allow
recovery recognize a duty only under special circumstances.").
213. 681 P.2d 893 (Cal. 1984).
214. Id. at 902. See also Hergenrether v. East, 393 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1964) (reinstating verdict
for plaintiff where defendant left key in ignition of truck for extended period of time in dangerous
neighborhood).
215. 285 P.2d 269 (Cal. 1955).
216. Id. at270.
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At the end of a working day, workers parked the bulldozers on top of a
mesa. One of the machines was locked with a lock provided by the dealer,
while the other was left practically unlocked.21 7 The following evening
three inebriated young men decided to go to the mesa for the purpose of
racing the bulldozers. They were unable to start the locked bulldozer but
succeeded in starting and setting the other one in motion. They drove it
around the mesa, and being unable to stop it, headed it toward a canyon,
and abandoned it. The bulldozer went off the edge of the mesa and caused
considerable damage, until it was finally stopped by a retaining wall. 218
The plaintiffs, who suffered personal injuries and property damage,
brought action for damages against the defendants. They alleged that
defendants were negligent in leaving the bulldozer unattended and
unlocked. 219 The trial jury found for the defendants, but the court granted
the plaintiffs' motions for a new trial on grounds of insufficiency of
evidence and jury misconduct. The defendants appealed.22°
The defendants relied on a precedent of the Supreme Court of
California in Richards v. Stanley,221 a key-in-car case in which the court
held that absent special circumstances, the owner of an automobile does not
owe a duty to remove the ignition key to protect other motorists from the
negligent driving of a thief.222  The Court distinguished Richards from
Richardson, and held that the dangers associated with a bulldozer in
uncontrolled motion and the foreseeability of intermeddling justify
imposing a duty on the owner to take reasonable care to prevent such
intermeddling.223 The court held that these circumstances are generally not
present in automobile cases, including Richards.224 Several factors in
Richardson made the intermeddling foreseeable: the bulldozer presented a
scarce opportunity to intermeddlers; it could be accessed without
authentication; it was easy to exploit; and it offered low access complexity.
Compared to automobiles and other "ordinary" vehicles, a bulldozer is





221. 271 P.2d23 (Cal.1954).
222. Id. at 27
223. 285 P2d, at 271 ("The extreme danger created by a bulldozer in uncontrolled motion and
the foreseeable risk of intermeddling fully justify imposing a duty on the owner to exercise
reasonable care to protect third parties from injuries arising from its operation by
intermeddlers.").
224. Id. at 271.("Since, however, the kinds of foreseeable intervening conduct by third
parties as well as the risks created by such conduct in this case are materially different from those
considered in the Richards case, that case is not controlling here.").
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greater fascination to onlookers. 225 Evidence showed that the defendant's
bulldozers attracted curious spectators, both during daytime operations, as
well as when they were parked overnight. Bulldozers also present a
different kind and level of risk from being set in motion when left
unattended.226 The court concluded that the public's fascination made it
reasonably foreseeable that the defendants' bulldozers might be tampered
with when left unattended.227
The bulldozer could be accessed without authentication because it was
left unattended in a public area and lacked an effective lock. The Court
observed that the risk of intermeddling with the unlocked bulldozer and
consequent harm could have been avoided by the use of a simple but
effective lock.228 The intermeddlers attempted to tamper with the other
bulldozer, which was locked, but failed to set it in motion.
The bulldozer was also easy to exploit and offered low access
complexity. Once the intermeddlers gained basic access to the bulldozer,
they faced few significant hurdles to starting the engine and setting it in
motion. A relatively unskilled person could start the machine and set the
bulldozer in motion, even though he may not have the skill to stop it.
229
The bulldozer was fuelled up. A person could start the engine when the
bulldozer was in gear simply by pushing in a lever and stepping on the
starter. If so started, the bulldozer would be set in motion immediately.
The bulldozer was left parked overnight, which provided intermeddlers
with a significant time window of opportunity.
In summary, intermeddling with the unlocked and unattended
bulldozer was foreseeable, because the machine was easy to exploit,
presented a scarce opportunity, was accessible without authentication, and
was exploitable with low access complexity. The Court granted plaintiffs'
motion for a new trial,23 ° concluding that the foreseeable risk of
intermeddling fully justified imposing a duty on the owners.
231
4. Ease of Exploitation
An opportunity that can be exploited conveniently and without
significant effort and skill on the part of a criminal or tortfeasor is
225. Id. at 274 (bulldozers have "a fascination which an ordinary automobile would not have
for the average person").
226. Id.
227. Id. at 271.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 274 ("It could be inferred from this that it would be a simple matter for a curious
person to start the machine without knowing how to stop it.").
230. Id. at 272.
231. Id.at269.
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characterized by courts and scholars as "easy to exploit." The unattended
bulldozer in Richards v. Ham232 presented an easily exploitable opportunity
because a relatively unskilled person could start the machine and set the
bulldozer in motion. Courts are more likely to impose liability on an
enabler who provided a relatively easily exploitable opportunity to an
intervening tortfeasor. The common law pattern of cases involving
workplace hazards illustrates this tendency.
Industrial machinery is typically manufactured with safety guards to
protect operators from injury. Factory owners are sometimes tempted to
remove a guard to expedite production and increase profitability, but do so
at the expense of greater risk of injury to workers. Foreseeability-"the
manufacturer's reasonable anticipation that the product will be altered by
removal of the safety guard in the quest for greater profitability"-is the
crucial determinant of a manufacturer's liability in these cases.2 33 Thus, in
civil actions, manufacturers of machinery with easily removable guards
face a greater likelihood of liability than manufacturers of machinery with a
guard that requires significant effort and skill to alter.234
In Lopez v. Precision Papers, Inc.,235 the plaintiffs employer had
removed the overhead guard on a forklift to improve its maneuverability.
An unprotected employee was struck by a falling object and rendered
paraplegic.236 In a subsequent lawsuit against the manufacturer, the
appellate court confirmed denial of defendant's motion for summary
judgment.237  The appellate court considered evidence of the ease with
which the safety guard could be removed, and concluded that "the forklift
was purposefully manufactured to permit its use without the safety
guard.
238
In Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division,239 a manufacturer designed
machinery with a complicated interlock system that made removal of a
safety shield difficult.240 The employer of the plaintiff circumvented this
232. Id.
233. See Rabin, supra note 8, at 447.
234. In lawsuits by injured workers, the manufacturer of the machine is usually a more
convenient target than the employer. See id. at 447 ("[T]he employer is shielded from tort
responsibility, and arguably, as a consequence, meaningful safety incentives, by the workers'
compensation laws. For this reason, the pragmatic attraction of enablers' liability - the ability to
target a realistic candidate for deterrence pressure, rather than the more egregious but tort-proof
employer - is a salient feature of the workplace scenario ....
235. 492 N.E.2d 1214 (N.Y. 1986).
236. Id. at 1215.
237. Id. at 1214..
238. Id. at 1215.
239. 403 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1980).
240. Id. at 441.
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difficulty by cutting holes in the safety shield so as to render the shield
ineffective. The plaintiff suffered injuries, and sued the manufacturer of
the machinery. The court found for the defendant, holding that the
employer's substantial modifications to the product shielded the
manufacturer from liability for defective design. 241  Although it is
foreseeable that employers will attempt to remove shields to increase
profitability, the defendant in this case had reduced the likelihood of
tampering by making the shield difficult to remove.242 The enabling
opportunity provided by the defendant was not easily exploitable, as the
intervenor had to make "substantial modifications" to achieve its goal.243
5. Anonymity
Bricks-and-mortar criminals 244  and cyber attackers245 alike are
emboldened by anonymity. Even "ordinary" law-abiding people tend to
exhibit out-of-character behavior in an anonymous crowd. In a classic
nineteenth century study of mass behavior, sociologist Gustave Le Bon
concluded that crowd behavior is impulsive and uncritical, and that people
act very differently in crowds than they do as individuals.246 Le Bon's
insights about the behavior of individuals in crowds have been confirmed
by more recent empirical studies by behavioral economists and social
psychologists. 47
Courts have recognized this phenomenon and the effect of anonymity
on anti-social behavior. In Guille v. Swan,248 the defendant descended in a
241. Id. at 444.
242. Id. ("Material alterations at the hands of a third party which work a substantial change in
the condition in which the product was sold by destroying the functional utility of a key safety
feature, however foreseeable that modification may have been, are not within the ambit of the
manufacturer's responsibility.").
243. Id.
244. See Grady, supra note 10, at 198.
245. ALLEN HOUSEHOLDER ET AL., MANAGING THE THREAT OF DENIAL-OF-SERVICE
ATTACKS 23 (10th ed., 2001), available at http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/ManagingDoS.pdf
("It is easy for attackers to avoid getting caught by hiding their identity. They command their
attack network from stolen dial-up accounts and other compromised systems, and they use
spoofed source addresses for attack traffic. Victim sites and law enforcement face a daunting and
frequently unfeasible task to identify and prosecute attackers. Suffering few consequences-if
any-for their actions, attackers continue their work. The combination of all these factors provide
a fertile environment for DoS agents."); JELENA MIRKOVIC ET AL, INTERNET DENIAL OF
SERVICE: ATTACK AND DEFENSE MECHANISMS 30 (2005); de Villiers, supra note 3, at 9-16
(noting that cyber criminals are emboldened by anonymity-preserving technologies of the
Internet).
246. GUSTAVE LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND 31 (2002).
247. See RICHARD A. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1993); Herbert A. Simon,
Theories of Bounded Rationality, in DECISION AND ORGANIZATION: A VOLUME IN HONOR OF
JACOB MARSCHAK (C.B. McGuire and Roy Radner eds., 1972).
248. 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y. 1822).
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balloon over New York City into plaintiff's garden in a manner that
attracted a crowd. The balloon dragged over the plaintiffs garden, but the
crowd did most of the damage to the garden. The defendant argued that he
should be responsible only for his share of the damages, and not for that
caused by the crowd, but the court held him responsible for all the
damages. 249 The court held that the behavior of the crowd was foreseeable
in that particular situation.250 The defendant's mode of arrival foreseeably
attracted the crowd, and the relative anonymity and diminished
accountability inspired the crowd's irresponsible behavior.25' Commenting
on Guille, Professor Grady explains, "courts are especially sensitive to the
fact that people behave differently in crowds. One reason must be that
being part of a crowd creates anonymity and makes it difficult for an
injured plaintiff to assign fault. Thus, a responsible person becomes a free
radical by joining an unruly crowd.,
252
An individual's relative anonymity on the Internet appears to have a
similar behavioral effect.253 Otherwise upstanding citizens in the physical
world behave in antisocial and even criminal ways in the relatively
anonymous world of the Internet.254 Professor Jelena Mirkovic comments,
"[t]his disassociation and lack of physical proximity encourages people to
participate in illegal activities in the Internet, such as hacking, denial of
service, or collecting copyrighted material. They do not feel that in reality
they are doing any serious harm." 255 The anonymity of the Internet further
emboldens cyber rogues by complicating the task of detecting computer
crimes and tracking down offenders, which makes it hard for authorities to
obtain evidence against a wrongdoer.256  The Internet provides the
249. Id. at 381-83.
250. Id. at 383 ("Now, if his descent, under such circumstances, would, ordinarily and
naturally, draw a crowd of people about him, either from curiosity, or for the purpose of rescuing
him from a perilous situation; all this he ought to have foreseen, and must be responsible for.").
251. Chief Justice Spencer stated that the defendant's manner of descent would foreseeably
draw a crowd with predictable consequences, for which he should be held responsible. Id. See
also Grady, supra note 10, at 201-02.
252. See Grady, supra note 10, at 214.
253. See HOUSEHOLDER ET AL., supra note 245, at 23; de Villiers, supra note 3, at 9-16
(noting that cyber criminals emboldened by anonymity-preserving technologies of the Internet).
254. John R. Suler and W. Phillips, The Bad Boys of Cyberspace: Deviant Behavior in
Online Multimedia Communities and Strategies for Managing It, 1 CyberPsychology and
Behavior, 275 (1998), available at http://www.rider.edu/-suler/psycyber/badboys.html. See also
JOHN .P. DAVIS, THE EXPERIENCE OF 'BAD' BEHAVIOR IN ONLINE SOCIAL SPACES: A SURVEY
OF ONLINE USERS, available at http://research.microsoft.com/scg/papers/Bad%20Behavior
%20Survey.pdf.
255. MIRKOVIC et al, supra note 245, at 30.
256. HOWARD F. LIPSON, TRACKING AND TRACING CYBER ATTACKS: TECHNICAL
CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL POLICY ISSUES 49 (2002), available at http://www.sei.cmu.edu
/publications/documents/02.reports/02sr009.htm ("Although promising, research on tracking and
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technological platform and opportunity to a skilled operator to assume
different identities, erase his digital footprints, and transfer incriminating
evidence electronically to innocent computers, often without leaving a
trace.257
Courts have recognized the perverse incentives and law enforcement
problems created by anonymous defendants in cyberspace. In Religious
Technology Center v Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,
258
which dealt with the misappropriation of trade secrets, the court cautioned
that an anonymous or judgment-proof defendant can do significant harm
and leave the plaintiff without recourse.259 In enabling cases where
anonymity makes the intervening tortfeasor hard to reach, courts that
impose liability on the primary tortfeasor are often concerned with
deterrence. Professor Rabin comments, for instance, that "the main
deterrence gap is the inability to effectively reach the putative wrongdoer
tracing cyber-attacks is in a nascent state. The lack of proven techniques for effectively and
consistently tracking sophisticated cyber-attacks to their source (and rarely to the individuals or
entities responsible) severely diminishes any deterrent effect. Perpetrators feel free to act with
nearly total anonymity."); MIRKOVIC ET AL, supra note 245, at 14 ("Very few attackers have been
caught and prosecuted .... [One] factor is the ease of performing a DoS attack without leaving
many traces for investigators to follow .... Another type of DoS perpetrator is a sophisticated
hacker who uses several means to obscure her identity and create subtle variations in traffic
patterns to bypass defenses."); Ian C. Ballon, Alternative Corporate Responses to Internet Data
Theft, 471 PLtIPat. 737, 739 (1997); Mary Calkins, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don't They? An
Economic Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory Models, 89 GEO. L.J. 171 (2000); Douglas.
Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable (John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 217, 2004), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv27n4/v27n4-7.pdf ("Sophisticated saboteurs use the
Internet's topology to conceal their tracks by routing messages and information through a
convoluted path that is difficult for authorities to uncover.").
257. Spammers and Viruses Unite, BBC NEWS, April 30, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1l/hi/technology/2988209.stm (last visited Feb., 8, 2008) (describing an
anonymity-preserving computer hijacking program named Proxy-Guzu). See also Noah Levine,
Note: Establishing Legal Accountability for Anonymous Communication in Cyberspace, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1530-33; Jay Lyman, Authorities Investigate Romanian Virus Writer,
L1NUXINSIDER.COM, Sep. 4, 2003, available at http://www.linuxinsider.com/perllstory
/31500.html (referring to "the difficulty of tracking down virus writers, particularly when they are
skilled enough to cover their digital tracks, [so that] few offenders are ever caught").
258. 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
259. Id. at 1255-57. See also Christopher Butler, Plotting the Return of an Ancient Tort to
Cyberspace: Toward a New Federal Standard of Responsibility for Defamation for Internet
Service Providers, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 260 (2000) (discussing Zeran v
America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), and commenting that a plaintiff injured by
anonymous speech of an ISP subscriber "was left without recourse once the court held AOL to be
immune from liability as a distributor of third party information content because the messages
had been posted by an anonymous person whose identity was never able to be traced").
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himself, either through criminal or tort sanctions. This is the crux of the
matter and the link to creating responsibility for enabling behavior."
260
Summary
The common law pattern shows that enablers foreseeably encourage
tortious and criminal behavior when they provide opportunities that are
scarce, easily exploitable, aligned with the objectives of the criminal, and
that provide the criminal with anonymity, unauthenticated access, and
access with low complexity. The next subsection develops and analyzes
analogous features of computer security vulnerabilities that make the
vulnerabilities foreseeably exploitable.
B. Forensic Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities
1. Ease of Exploitation
Easily exploitable security vulnerabilities are more likely to be
targeted by attackers. 261 A target's ease of exploitation depends on the
availability and quality of exploit code to leverage the vulnerability.
2 62
This feature varies substantially across different vulnerabilities.263  A
vulnerability that allows a hacker to access a university's confidential
student records by simply clicking on a hyperlink posted on the Internet is
easy to exploit. In contrast, a vulnerability that can only be exploited by a
highly skilled and technically sophisticated attacker is difficult to exploit.
260. Rabin, supra note 8, at 444 (referencing Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439
F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
261. See, e.g., SYMANTEC SECURITY UPDATE - JUNE 2005 4 (2005),
http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/SSUAMS_06 2005.pdf ("The threat of severe
vulnerabilities is increased if and when an associated exploit is released publicly or if the
vulnerability can be exploited trivially."). See also Scott Carpenter, Vulnerability Management
Solutions, ITDEFENSE MAGAZINE, April 2006, at 2, available at
http://www.itdefensemag.com/8_06/issue-cover.php ("If a proof of concept exploit is made
available the same day the vulnerability is published (i.e. zero day exploit), and a patch is not yet
available, a virus or worm likely will be created from this vulnerability."). See also SYMANTEC,
COMPREHENSIVE THREAT MANAGEMENT: A SYMANTEC SOLUTION FOR MODERN-DAY ATTACK
PROTECTION 4-5, available at https://www4.symantec.com/Vrt/offer?aid=20197 (explaining
that the combination of financial incentives and easy access to malevolent code has increased the
number of computer security breaches).
262. See SYMANTEC INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT TRENDS FOR JULY - DECEMBER
06, supra note 18, at 90; FOSTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 10; PETER MELL, KAREN SCARFONE, &
SASHA ROMANOSKY, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO COMMON VULNERABILITY SCORING SYSTEM
VERSION 2.0 10 (2007), available at http://www.first.org/cvss/cvss-guide.pdf ("Public availability
of easy-to-exploit code increases the number of potential attackers by including those who are
unskilled .... ).
263. See also SZOR, supra note 22, at 547 ("Some vulnerabilities are easily exploited by the
attackers, while others take months to develop.").
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The following classification defines ease of exploitation of a
vulnerability in relation to its exploit code:
264
1. Unproven: No exploit code is available.
2. Proof of concept: The only exploit code available for vulnerabilities
in this category is "proof-of-concept." Proof-of-concept code is a program
with the sole purpose of verifying the existence of a vulnerability. It is not
sufficiently functional to exploit the vulnerability.
3. Functional: Functional exploit code is publicly available for
vulnerabilities in this category. Attackers can exploit some incidences of
the vulnerability without having to use sophisticated programming
techniques or other technical skills of their own.
4. High: Functional exploit code is available for every exploitable
incidence of the vulnerability. It is reliably exploitable, and there have
been instances of actual exploitation by self-propagating malevolent code.
Vulnerabilities in the latter two categories are easy to exploit, because
leveraging those vulnerabilities requires minimal technical sophistication.
Vulnerabilities in the first two categories are difficult to exploit, because
attackers must create exploit code or develop existing proof-of-concept
code to leverage the vulnerability.
265
Many incidences of the buffer overflow vulnerability belong to the
"easy to exploit" category. Writing an original effective exploit for a
vulnerability such as the buffer overflow generally requires considerable
programming skill, but exploit code is often publicly available and
accessible to individuals without technical sophistication. Using publicly
available exploit code often requires little more than basic programming
skills and standard software tools. As new buffer overflow vulnerabilities
are discovered, exploits are habitually published shortly after the
discovery.266
A vulnerability in the Solaris KCMS Library Service System for
instance, belongs to the "easy to exploit" category. It can be exploited by
drawing on a standard and widely available software tool and basic
264. See Presentation, Ivan Arce, On the Quality of Exploit Code (June 2004), available at
http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/CSI-NetSec2OO4.ppt; SYMANTEC INTERNET
SECURITY THREAT REPORT TRENDS FOR JULY - DECEMBER 06, supra note 18, at 90.
265. SYMANTEC INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT TRENDS FOR JULY - DECEMBER 06,
supra note 18, at 90.
266. For a review of publicly available exploits, see Takanen et al., supra note 55. See, e.g.,
NATHAN P. SMITH, STACK SMASHING VULNERABILITIES IN THE UNIX OPERATING SYSTEM,
(1997), available at http://destroy.net/machines/security/nate-buffer.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2008)
(thorough academic survey, covering history and terminology, various vulnerabilities and related
technologies, as well as solutions). See also DAVID LITCHFIELD, EXPLOITING WINDOWS NT 4
BUFFER OVERRUNS, available at http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers /ntbufferoverflow.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
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computer literacy. 26' Not all vulnerabilities are easy to exploit, though, and
the time and skill required to create an exploit vary among
vulnerabilities.268 A buffer overflow vulnerability in NOD32 antivirus
software, for instance, is relatively difficult to exploit, because only proof-
of-concept exploit code has been released. The code requires substantial
modification by a skilled attacker in order to exploit the vulnerability.269
Computer security vulnerabilities that are easy to exploit are
analogous to the escape opportunity given to the inmates in Home Office v
Dorset Yacht Co.,27° or the circumstances in Richardson v. Ham,271 which
made intermeddling with a bulldozer foreseeable.
2. Scarcity of Opportunity
An opportunity is "scarce" if it meets the objectives of a wrongdoer
and no reasonably equivalent opportunity is readily available. The
unlocked door in Stansbie272 is an example of a scarce opportunity.
Valuables are usually locked up, and the only alternative means of access
available to the thief was entry in a way more likely to attract attention.
A computer security vulnerability is a scarce opportunity to an
attacker who is using a virus or worm which is programmed to exploit the
specific vulnerability. 273  Malevolent code is often designed to target a
specific system and vulnerability type. The Morris worm,, 2 74 for instance,
had a three-pronged attack vector. It first invaded user accounts on the
target machine by "guessing" passwords, encrypting them, and comparing
267. See AusCERT Alert, Vulnerablity in Solaris 2.5 KCMS, May 1, 1997,
http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it-69. For further examples of easily exploitable
vulnerabilities, see Bill Brenner, The Exploits of August, SECURITY NEWS, Aug. 12, 2005,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid 14_gci I 115378,00.html# ("MS05-
039 is a remote RPC vulnerability that . . . is a very easy to exploit vulnerability.") and Ryan
Naraine, Exploit Allows Windows XP Piracy, EWEEK.COM, May 23, 2005,
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Windows/Exploit-Allows-Windows-XP-Piracy/, (Describing a
vulnerability in Microsoft's Windows Genuine Advantage as uncomplicated and easy to
exploit.").
268. SMITH, supra note 266, at 2; SZOR, supra note 22, at 547 ("Some vulnerabilities are
easily exploited by the attackers, while others take months to develop.").
269. See National Vulnerability Database (CVE-2003-0062), http://nvd.nist.gov
/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2003-0062 (last modified Dec. 21, 2006). See also SZOR, supra note
22, at 402 (describing the OpenSSL buffer overflow vulnerability as challenging to exploit).
270. [1970] 2 A.C. 1004 (appeal taken from Eng.).
271. 285 P.2d 269 (Cal 1955).
272. [1948] 2 K.B. 48.
273. See Weaver et al., supra note 42, at 2 (explaining that certain worms are designed to
exploit specific vulnerabilities, and are programmed to search and locate hosts that contain these
vulnerabilities).
274. See, e.g., NAZARIO, supra note 104, at 39-41 (history of the Morris worm).
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the encrypted words to the system's encrypted password file.275 The worm
simultaneously exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability in the Fingerd
276program, 6 and also attempted to exploit a trapdoor in the sendmail mail
handler.
277
A scarce opportunity is also characterized by a paucity of equally
attractive alternative opportunities. If most instances of a targeted
vulnerability have been remediated, the few remaining unremediated ones
will be scarce opportunities to scavenging worms looking for them. A
vendor typically remediates a vulnerability by providing a patch to fix the
vulnerability and issuing security alerts to potentially affected users. Such
notification heightens awareness of the vulnerability among legitimate
users and rogues alike, further increasing the likelihood of exploitation of
unpatched versions of the vulnerability. The scarcity of the opportunity
presented by a vulnerability exploited in a cyber attack, therefore, depends
on whether the virus used in the attack specialized in the specific
vulnerability, and the prevalence of the vulnerability on the Internet.
This article adopts the following standard classification of the
remediation level of a vulnerability:
278
1. Official fix: A final official patch is available from the vendor that
eliminates the vulnerability, or an upgrade is available that does not contain
the vulnerability.
2. Temporary fix: The vendor has released a temporary patch for a
vulnerability in this category.
3. Workaround: A patch is available, but it is temporary and not
officially issued by the vendor. A user or group of users may, for instance,
have created and distributed a fix.
4. Unavailable: There is no practicable solution available.
Category (1) represents the highest remediation level and Category (4)
represents the lowest. A remediation score assigns a numerical value to
each remediation category. The "scarcity score" for a vulnerability is then
obtained by multiplying the vulnerability's remediation score by a scaling
275. SZOR, supra note 22, at 395-97.
276. Fingerd is a continuously running program that responds to requests for information
about system users. See PFLEEGER & PFLEEGER, supra note 7, at 136.
277. The sendmail program normally runs in the background, awaiting a command to
transmit mail. It typically receives a command and the message, as well as a destination address.
The Morris worm, however, caused the sendmail program to receive and execute malevolent code
instead of a destination address. See generally BRYAN COSTALES AND ERIC ALLMAN, SENDMAIL
(3d ed., 2002).
278. See Victor-Valeriu Patriciu, Justin Priescu, & Sebastian Nicolaescu, Security Metrics for
Enterprise Information Systems, 1 JOURNAL OF APPLIED QUANTITATIVE METHODS 154 (2006).
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factor. The scaling factor is a binary value which measures whether the
vulnerability was targeted or not.
3. Unauthenticated Access
"Authentication" refers to procedures by which a computer system
verifies the identity of a party from whom it has received a
communication. 279  The login procedure is a well-known authentication
procedure. It authenticates the identity of a user whose password and
stated identity match. If they do not match, the user is restricted from
accessing the system. Other examples of authentication include the
requirement of confirmation e-mail to activate an on-line account, ATM
access procedures, cryptographic authentication of a digitally signed
contract, and biometric identification in applications such as Internet
banking.
280
Authentication provides a line of defense against unauthorized access
to sensitive information. A vulnerability that allows a user to bypass this
line of defense is said to allow unauthenticated access. Network
vulnerabilities, including buffer overflows, often allow unauthenticated
remote access to unauthorized individuals. 28' A vulnerability in Fusion
News, for instance, a news management program for web servers, allows
remote unauthenticated attackers to create arbitrary user accounts on the
Fusion News server by sending a specially crafted request to the server. If
properly structured, the request could also be used to gain administrative
access. Exploitation of the vulnerability is trivial, as a ready-to-use sample
server request is available on the Internet. 282 This vulnerability contains
several critical elements favorable to a cyber attacker: It is easily
exploitable, and allows unauthenticated access, root access, and remote
access.
279. See PFLEEGER & PFLEEGER, supra note 7, at § 4.5.
280. Id. at 219-220; Citron, supra note 2, at 249-50.
281. See, e.g., Advisory, Next Generation Security Software, Microsoft NetDDE Service
Unauthenticated Remote Buffer Overflow (Jan. 21 2005), http://www.ngssoftware.com
/advisories/netddefull.txt (Reporting a vulnerability in the Microsoft DDE service that allows a
remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on a system without authentication.). Microsoft has
released an update addressing the vulnerability. Security Bulletin, MicrosofiTechNet,
Vulnerability in NetDDE Could Allow Remote Code Execution (841533),
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-031.mspx. See also DOROTHY E.
DENNING, INFORMATION WARFARE AND SECURITY 214 (1999) (explaining that hackers can
execute malicious code remotely, without logging in and providing a valid password, by
exploiting buffer overflow vulnerabilities).
282. DarkKnight, Fusen News 3.3. Account Add Vulnerability, NEOHAPSIS, Aug. 15, 2003,




A computer security vulnerability that grants unauthenticated access is
the cyber analogue of an unlocked door or conveniently placed scaffold,
both of which provide access to an unauthorized entrant.
4. Access Complexity
"Access complexity" measures the complexity of attack required to
exploit a vulnerability beyond basic access. A vulnerability has high
access complexity if an attacker faces additional barriers to exploiting the
vulnerability once the attacker has gained basic access to a target system.
283
In many cases, once a system has been penetrated, exploitation of the
vulnerability is straightforward. A simple buffer overflow vulnerability in
a server program that runs continuously, for instance, has low access
complexity. Once an intruder has leveraged the vulnerability to inject
malevolent code, there are no additional barriers to executing the code.
The attacker can hijack the server program at will and run the attack code,
often at the same level of privilege as the server program. 84
A vulnerability with high access complexity is characterized by
specialized access conditions. It may, for instance, be exploitable only
during a narrow time frame, or its successful exploitation may require non-
default technical conditions or special "cooperation" from the victim. 285
For example, a vulnerability has been reported in Microsoft Windows
which was not remotely exploitable by default, but could be exploited via a
Web page "if the user has installed an application with custom URL
handlers and then uninstalled that application, and the uninstall failed to
correctly remove the application completely., 286  In addition to this
fortuitous sequence of events, the attacker would have to create an HTML
Web page according to narrow technical specifications in order to exploit
the vulnerability.287 This vulnerability is therefore exploitable only under
specific non-default conditions, a characteristic of high access complexity.
283. See MIKE SCHIFFMAN, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE COMMON VULNERABILITY
SCORING SYSTEM (CVSS) 3 (2005), available at http://www.packetfactory.net/papers/CVSS
/guide/index.html (last modified June 7, 2005).
284. Id. at 4.
285. See generally Mell, Scarfone, & Romanosky, supra note 19; Presentation, Mike
Schiffman, The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (Feb. 2005), available at
http://www.packetfactory.net/papers/CVSS/cvss-ppt.pdf.
286. See Security Bulletin, AUSCERT, Unchecked Buffer in Windows Shell Could Lead to
Code Execution, (Mar. 11, 2002), available at http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1779.
See also Security Advisory: Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-014 - securites vulnerabilities
database, http://securityvulns.com/docs2607.html (last modified Oct. 3, 2002).
287. Security Bulletin, AUSCERT, Unchecked Buffer in Windows Shell Could Lead to Code
Execution, (Mar. 11, 2002), available at http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=-1779.
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It is therefore less foreseeably exploitable than an equivalent vulnerability
without these complicating factors. a88
A simple buffer overflow vulnerability with low access complexity is
analogous to the situation in Richardson v. Ham,289 the bulldozer case. In
Richardson, the intermeddlers had unauthenticated access to a bulldozer,
because the machine was left unlocked and parked in a public place. The
intermeddlers also enjoyed low access complexity, because there were no
significant additional barriers to exploiting the bulldozer. The bulldozer
was fueled up, was easy to start, and it could be started in gear, which
automatically set it in motion. It was also left parked overnight, so that the
intermeddlers had a significant time window of opportunity.
5. Remote Access
A vulnerability is remotely exploitable when it enables a user to
access and execute commands on a target system across a network. A
vulnerability that grants only local access requires physical access or a
local account on the target system. An attacker with remote access may
effectively take over a remote console and enter keystrokes and commands
as if the attacker had local access. Some versions of the rlogin program for
instance, contain a vulnerability that allows attackers to launch a remote
attack on any vulnerable system connected to the Internet.29 °
Remote access offers obvious advantages to an attacker, such as
291convenience, fewer physical risks than on-site entry, and anonymity.The anonymity and geographic distance also help the attacker by
288. See also SANS CRITICAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS, Feb. 3, 2004,
http://www.sans.org/newsletters/cva/vol2_4.php. The advisory describes the SpamAssassin
buffer overflow as "challenging to exploit." To succeed, a would-be attacker would have to
identify and target victims who are using a vulnerable spam filter.
289. 285 P.2d 269 (Cal 1955).
290. The rlogin program, which is available on most UNIX systems, allows a legitimate user
to access the UNIX system from a remote terminal. Many versions of the rlogin program,
however, contain a vulnerability that allows attackers to inject and remotely execute arbitrary
code on the vulnerable machine, and run the attack code with root privileges. Such an attack can
be launched remotely from any location with an Intemet connection to a targeted institution's
Web site. See LAWRENCE R. ROGERS, RLOGIN(l): THE UNTOLD STORY 3, 16, 23 (1998),
available at http://www.sei.cmu.edu/publications/documents/98.reports/98tr0 17
/98tr017abstract.html; SZOR, supra note 22, at 341.
291. PFLEEGER & PFLEEGER, supra note 7, at 397 ("An attacker can mount an attack from
thousands of miles away and never come into direct contact with the system, its administrators, or
users. The potential attacker is thus safe behind an electronic shield."); SYMANTEC SECURITY
UPDATE - JUNE 2005, supra note 261, at 4 ("Remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerabilities
are particularly dangerous, as skilled attackers can carry out exploitation without alerting a target
user to the attack.").
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complicating law enforcement efforts to establish jurisdiction, obtain
extradition, and procure evidence.292
Vulnerabilities, such as the buffer overflow, are useful springboards to
gain remote access to a target system because they allow a remote attacker
to inject malevolent code directly into the execution path of a remote
system.293  The newly injected viral code can then create further
opportunities for other remote attackers.294 Remotely exploitable buffer
overflow vulnerabilities have recently been reported in well-known
products, such as Sendmail, various Microsoft products, and, ironically,
PGP.295  A vulnerability in Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser, for
instance, allowed a properly formatted HTML document to cause a buffer
overflow. This flaw could be remotely exploited to execute arbitrary code
on the affected system with the privileges of the user running Internet
292. See, e.g., Henderson & Yarbrough, supra note 103, at 11 ("[T]oday's Internet can be
crippled by distributed denial-of-service attacks launched by relatively unsophisticated and
judgment-proof parties."); Id. at 16 ("Similarly, in the case of a DDoS attack, the person who uses
the weapon ... is generally clearly liable, but that person is often either impossible to locate, is
judgment-proof, or both."); HOUSEHOLDER ET AL., supra note 245, at 23 ("It is easy for attackers
to avoid getting caught by hiding their identity. They command their attack network from stolen
dial-up accounts and other compromised systems, and they use spoofed source addresses for
attack traffic. Victim sites and law enforcement face a daunting and frequently unfeasible task to
identify and prosecute attackers. Suffering few consequences-if any-for their actions,
attackers continue their work.").
293. SZOR, supra note 22, at 68. The so-called backdoor is a widely used device to gain
unauthorized remote access to a system. A back door system such as the infamous Back Orifice,
allows an attacker to obtain information about the system on which it is installed, including
information on currently running programs and the contents and nature of files and directories on
the system. It also allows the remote intruder to download files from the system and submit
commands to it. Cyber attackers frequently employ viruses and worms to leverage backdoors to
penetrate and compromise target systems. Malevolent code that utilizes backdoor interfaces
include worms such as Nimda, which exploited a backdoor opened by CodeRed. The W32/Borm
worm used network scanning and fingerprinting techniques to locate exploitable backdoor-
compromised systems. Id. at 309-311, 331; HARLEY, SLADE & GATTIKER, supra note 29, at 74;
Thomas Chen, Trends in Viruses and Worms, INTERNET PROTOCOL J., available at
http://engr.smu.edu/-tchen/papers/Cisco%201PJ sep2003.pdf.
294. The Nimda worm, for instance, attacked via backdoors left by worms such as CodeRed.
See SZOR, supra note 22, at 309-311, 331.
295. See, e.g., Security Response, Symantec, Sendmail Header Processing Buffer Overflow
Vulnerability, (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter
/security/Content/3.3.2003.html ("A remotely exploitable vulnerability has been discovered in
Sendmail. This vulnerability is due to a buffer overflow condition in the SMTP header-parsing
component. Remote attackers may exploit this vulnerability by connecting to target SMTP
servers and transmitting them malformed data."). Pretty Good Privacy, popularly known as PGP,
is a computer program that provides cryptographic privacy and authentication. PGP is often used
for signing, encrypting and decrypting e-mails to increase reliability for e-mail communications.
It was originally created by Philip Zimmermann in 1991. See, e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED
CRYPTOGRAPHY 587 (1995).
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Explorer.296 Some vulnerabilities are not remotely exploitable in a default
installation, but can be remotely exploited under unusual conditions and
with application of significant technical expertise by an aspiring attacker.297
A vulnerability without remote access offers limited scope for a virus
or worm attack, and is therefore less likely to be exploited. 298  A recent
Microsoft Security Bulletin advises of the existence of an image parsing
vulnerability in Microsoft Office that allowed an attacker to install
programs, create new accounts with full user rights, and change or delete
data on a client workstation. This was a local vulnerability, and not
remotely exploitable. The Security Bulletin concludes, "we do not expect
to see widespread exploitation of these vulnerabilities in current operating
system versions. 299
Courts have recognized that anonymity encourages wrongdoing.
300
The common law position is supported by empirical research which
suggests that cyber criminals are encouraged by anonymity-preserving
technologies, such as the Internet. 30  A vulnerability that enables a remote
attack behind the Internet's cloak of anonymity is therefore foreseeably
exploitable, as a matter of common law precedent as well as technology-
created economic incentives.
6. Root Access
Cyber rogues favor vulnerabilities that closely meet their objectives.
An intruder intent on stealing sensitive information from a financial
296. Advisory, CERT, Buffer Overflow in Microsoft Internet Explorer (Feb. 25, 2002),
available at http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-04.html (last modified Apr. 2, 2002). This
document also advises on other remotely exploitable vulnerabilities in Microsoft Internet
Explorer.
297. See id.
298. See Scott Carpenter, Vulnerability Management Solutions, ITDEFENSE MAGAZINE,
Apr. 2006, at 2, available at http://www.itdefensemag.com/8_06/issue cover.php ("If the
vulnerability is not remotely exploitable, the likelihood of a virus based on the vulnerability alone
is minimized.").
299. Security Bulletin, MicrosoftTechNet, Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office Filters Could
Allow Remote Code Execution (915384) (July 11, 2006), https://www.microsoft.com
/technet/security/bulletin /ms06-039.mspx (last modified Nov. 29, 2006). See also Security
Bulletin, Adobe ,Coldfusion Sandbox Secunty Vulnerability (Sept. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb06-13.html (reporting a vulnerability in
Coldfusion software versions MX 7 and MX 7.01, which is not remotely exploitable).
300. See, e.g., Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y. 1822); Religious Tech. Ctr. v Netcom
On-Line Comm'n. Servs., Inc., 923 F.Supp. 1231, 1255-57 (9th Cir. 1995) (when referring to
misappropriation of trade secrets, the court cautioned that an anonymous or judgment-roof
defendant can do significant harm and leave the plaintiff without recourse).
301. See, e.g., MIRKOVIC ET AL, supra note 245, at 30 ("This disassociation and lack of
physical proximity encourages people to participate in illegal activities in the Internet, such as
hacking, denial of service, or collecting copyrighted material. They do not feel that in reality they
are doing any serious harm."). See also Suler & Philips, supra note 254; DAVIS, supra note 254.
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institution for instance needs access to the institution's information system
at the privilege level of an administrator who has authority to access and
transmit such information. This is usually the most privileged level of
access, namely full root-level access.
"Root" is the conventional name of the super-user who has all rights
in all modes on a computer system. This is usually the system
administrator's account. The super-user has privileges that an ordinary
user does not have, such as authority to change the ownership of files;
install and run programs; change Web Server databases; add, change, or
delete system files or data; and change or replace web pages. 30 2  An
attacker who gains root access inherits these privileges. If a program is
already running with root privileges, an appropriately configured
vulnerability may be exploited to hijack the program and transfer root
control to the attacker.30 3 The attacker can then effectively become the
administrator of the network or system. Root access is the cyber analogue
to real-space insider access to a company's information resources, usually
obtained through bribery or blackmail of company insiders by foreign
governments, competitors and organized crime.304
Many known vulnerabilities yield root access to an attacker. The
Linux application DosEMU, for instance, contained a vulnerability that
assisted an attacker in gaining root access.30 5 The Apple Mac OS Apple
Filing Server Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability 30 6 likewise allowed
attackers to remotely compromise a vulnerable computer to gain
administrator-level access. Attackers typically exploited this vulnerability
to inject malevolent code into the vulnerable computer over a network or
the Internet, and run it with root privileges. 307 Not all vulnerabilities allow
root access. A buffer overflow vulnerability reported in the IMAP Server,
for instance, allowed remote exploitation, but not root access.30 8
302. HOGLUND & MCGRAW, supra note 93, at 151-53.
303. DENNING, supra note 259, at 214 (describing malicious code executed via a buffer
overflow as executing "with the privileges of the program it exploits, which is often root").
304. Id. at 131.
305. See, e.g., SecuriTeam - DosEMU Buffer Overflow Assists in Gaining Root,
http://www.securiteam.com/exploits/2GUPVSAQ0O.html (last modified July 9, 1999).
306. See Apple Mac OS X Security Update 2005-006 Multiple Vulnerabilities,
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13899 (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
307. See SYMANTEC SECURITY UPDATE -JUNE 2005, supra note 261, at 5.
308. See Security Advisory, Security Reason, UW-IMAP Netmailbox Name Parsing Buffer
Overflow Vulnerability (May 10, 2005), http://securityreason.com/securityalert/47. See also
SANS CRITICAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS, Dec. 8, 2002, http://www.sans.org/newsletters/cva
/cval 20.php ("The Cyrus IMAP server for UNIX contains a remotely exploitable buffer
overflow that allows non-authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of
the server process (typically not root).") (Emphasis added).
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Root level enablement is aligned with the objectives of cyber attackers
who need high-level access to a company's most sensitive information. A
feature in a vulnerability that allows root access to a system therefore
contributes to the foreseeability of exploitation of the vulnerability.
Summary
The analysis presented in this section has identified technical features
that make a computer security vulnerability foreseeably exploitable. The
features, which are cyber analogues of traditional common law
counterparts, are as follows: (1) the availability in the public domain of
user-friendly tools to leverage the vulnerability to gain basic access to a
targeted system, (2) the facilitation of unauthenticated access to the
targeted system, (3) the facilitation of remote access, (4) the facilitation of
anonymous access, (5) the insignificance of the complexity of the attack
once basic access has been obtained, and (6) the vulnerability uniquely
meets the objectives of the exploiter.
VII.A Foreseeability Metric
This section proposes a numerical metric that combines values for
each of the attributes described in the previous section into a composite
score that represents the foreseeability of exploitation of a vulnerability.
The attributes are listed below, together with proposed scores for each
category within an attribute. The chosen numerical values are not arbitrary,
but are consistent with industry standards, such as the Common
Vulnerability Scoring System ("CVSS"), developed by the U.S. National
Infrastructure Assurance Council. 30 9 The values are also consistent with
the objectives of the metric, in the sense that the numerical values
associated with individual attributes increase with that attribute's
contribution to foreseeability. A vulnerability for which there is no exploit
code available, for instance, is assigned a relatively low value for "ease of
exploitation," namely 0.85. A vulnerability for which functional exploit
code is available for every exploitable incidence of the vulnerability, is
assigned a maximum value of 1.0.
The vulnerability attributes on which the foreseeability metric is
based, and the numerical indices associated with each category of the
attributes, are listed below.
309. See, e.g., Mell, Scarfone, & Romanosky, supra note 19, at 85. CVSS was developed by
the U.S. National Infrastructure Assurance Council, a group of industry leaders who advise the
US Department of Homeland Security on critical information infrastructure security. Id.
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A. Ease of Exploitation
The following classification defines ease of exploitation of a
vulnerability in relation to its exploit code. It lists the various categories to
which exploit code for a vulnerability may belong. 310 The numerical index
in brackets represents the degree to which the category contributes to
foreseeability of exploitation. The highest index ("1"), for instance, is
assigned to a vulnerability for which functional exploit code is available for
every exploitable incidence of the vulnerability, (the "High" category).
The ease of exploitation scores are:
1. Unproven [0.85].




This metric depends on the level of remediation of the vulnerability





3. Temporary fix [0.95].
4. Official fix [1.00].
The composite scarcity score is obtained by multiplying the
remediation level score by 1.0 if the vulnerability was targeted, and by 0.5
if it was not.
C. Access Complexity
1. High: Additional barriers to exploitation exist [0.8].
2. Low: The target is exploitable under general conditions [1.0].
D. Unauthenticated Access
1. The attacker does not need authentication to access and exploit the
vulnerability [1.0].
2. The attacker needs authentication to access and exploit the
vulnerability [0.6].
E. Remote Access
1. Vulnerability allows only local access [0.7].
310. The categories are defined and described, supra §VIII(A).
311. The remediation categories are defined and described, supra § VIII(B).
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2. Vulnerability allows remote access [1.0].
F. Root Access
1. Vulnerability allows root access [1.0].
2. Vulnerability does not allow root access [0.6].
G. Information Security Impact
This metric measures the impact on confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of information of a successful exploit of the vulnerability.
A. Confidentiality impact: None [0]; Partial [0.7]; Complete [1.0].
B. Integrity impact: None [0]; Partial [0.7]; Complete [1.0].
C. Availability impact: None [0]; Partial [0.7]; Complete [1.0].
A, B, and C are equally weighted to calculate the information security
impact metric.
In an environment where confidentiality is emphasized, the weights
assigned to A, B, and C respectively, are [0.5; 0.25; 0.25]. If integrity is
emphasized, the weights are [0.25; 0.5; 0.25], and when availability is
emphasized, the weights are [0.25; 0.25; 0.5].
Composite Foreseeability Score
The composite foreseeability score for a vulnerability is calculated by
applying the following steps: (1) determine the appropriate category and
score for each of attributes I through VII for the vulnerability, (2) calculate
the product of the scores, (3) multiply the score by 10, and (4) round the
result to the nearest integer. The resultant score is a numerical index, on a
scale from 1 to 10, of the foreseeability of exploitation of the vulnerability.
This article will now discuss illustrative examples of the application of
the metric to real-world vulnerabilities.
a. CVE:-2003-0818: Microsoft Windows ASN.1 Library Integer Handling
Vulnerability
312
This is a buffer overflow vulnerability in Microsoft Windows which
allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges. It allows
unauthenticated access and is remotely exploitable. The vulnerability
offers the additional advantage of low access complexity, because no
additional effort or special circumstances are necessary for a successful
exploit. Functional exploit code is publicly available. Microsoft released a
patch (MS04-007) to remediate the vulnerability, so that the remediation
312. See National Vulnerability Database (CVE-2003-0818), http://nvd.nist.gov
/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2003-0818 (last modified Mach 28, 2006).
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level is classified as "Official Fix. 313  The vulnerability's multiple
attractive properties (from an attacker's viewpoint) suggest that
exploitation of this vulnerability is highly foreseeable.
The foreseeability composite score is calculated as follows:
METRIC EVALUATION SCORE
Ease of exploitation Functional 0.95
Scarcity Official-Fix, Targeted 1.0
Access Complexity Low 1.0
Unauthenticated Access Yes 1.0
Remote Access Yes 1.0
Root Access Yes 1.0
Info Sec Impact C/I/A, Equally Weighted 1.0
The foreseeability score for this vulnerability is calculated as:
ROUND [10 x 0.95 x 1.0 x 1.0 x 1.0 x 1.0 x 1.0 x 1.0] = 10.0.
The high value for the foreseeability metric (10/10) is consistent with the
prima facie impression that the vulnerability is a tempting target and likely
to be exploited.
b. CVE-2003-0062: Buffer Overflow in NOD32 Antivirus
314
This buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in February 2003 in
Linux and UNIX versions of NOD32, an antivirus application. The
vulnerability allowed attackers to execute arbitrary code with the privileges
of the user running NOD32. The vulnerability was not remotely
exploitable and had significant access complexity. To execute malevolent
code via the buffer overflow, an attacker had to wait for another user to
scan a directory path of excessive length. If a user executed the scan, full
compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information
on the target system was possible. Proof-of-concept level exploit code is
available for the metric. The developer of NOD32 (Eset) has released
313. Id.
314. See National Vulnerability Database (CVE-2003-0062), http://nvd.nist.gov
/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2003-0062 (last modified Dec. 21, 2006).
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updated software, giving the vulnerability the highest remediation level of
"Official Fix."
315
The foreseeability score for this vulnerability is calculated as follows:
METRIC EVALUATION SCORE
Ease of exploitation Proof-of-Concept 0.9
Scarcity Official-Fix, Not Targeted 0.5
Access Complexity High 0.8
Unauthenticated Access Yes 1.0
Remote Access Local 0.7
Root Access Yes 1.0
Info Sec Impact C/I/A, Complete 1.0
The foreseeability score for this vulnerability is calculated as:
ROUND [10 x 0.9 x 0.5 x 0.8 x 1.0 x 0.7 x 1.0 x 1.0] = 3.0
This vulnerability contains several features that make it unattractive to
an attacker, and is therefore not highly foreseeably exploitable. In order to
successfully exploit the vulnerability, a prospective attacker must develop
exploit code beyond the available proof-of-concept. This requires a level
of skill and effort that would decrease the number of prospective exploiters.
An attacker would have to contend with access complexity, such as having
to wait for non-default conditions before a successful attack can be
launched. An attacker would also have to work within the limitations of
local access. The vulnerability has a high remediation level, but the fact
that it is not specifically targeted makes it less likely to be exploited.
A vulnerability that contains each attribute at its highest level, in
contrast, would have the highest possible foreseeability score, namely a
"perfect 10." A cyber rogue who contemplates designing a worm to exploit
a specific vulnerability would likely prefer to target a "10" vulnerability,




This article presents an analysis of civil liability for database owners'
failure to safeguard confidential information. It focuses on situations where
database owners fail to patch a computer security vulnerability, which
facilitates compromise of sensitive information. In a civil action against a
database owner, a key element of the liability analysis is the foreseeability
of exploitation of the vulnerability at issue. This is the focus of the article.
An analysis of the law and technology of a cyber attack identifies features
that make a vulnerability foreseeably exploitable. The article further
presents a numerical metric of the foreseeability of exploitation of a
vulnerability. The metric combines numerical values for proxies of the
"foreseeability features" into a composite score that represents the
foreseeability of exploitation of the vulnerability.
The proposed metric is not intended to displace expert discretion and
human judgment, but rather, to complement it. 316 The metric is designed to
be flexible and allows expert users to adapt it to particular situations.
Consider, for instance, the case of two identical security vulnerabilities, one
in a computer system with defensive strategies such as firewalls and
intrusion detection, and the other in an insecure system. The superior
security has reduced the likelihood that a vulnerability in the secure system
will be exploited. It may be more difficult to exploit in the secure system,
because an attacker has to use substantial technical expertise to circumvent
the firewall. The security configuration may also allow exploitation of the
vulnerability only during an extremely limited time window, a feature
known as "high access complexity." Even though the vulnerabilities are
identical, the vulnerability in the secure system should be given lower
foreseeability scores for "ease of exploitation" and "access complexity",
compared to the vulnerability in the insecure system.
Other variables could plausibly have been included in the metric, but
the chosen set reflects a compromise between completeness, parsimony,
and accuracy. Some of the variables in the model can be refined. The
authentication metric in the baseline model, for instance, does not
differentiate between one or multiple authentication steps. It simply asks, in
binary fashion, whether exploitation of a vulnerability does, or does not,
require authentication. As such, it does not distinguish between a
316. See IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS How ANYTHING CAN BE PREDICTED 116-124
(2007), (exploring the co-existence of expert discretion and statistical models and discussing a
Virginia statute which allows the Virginia Department of Corrections to subject an offender who
has served his full sentence to civil commitment in a state mental hospital. The statute specifies
that the commitment process should be set in motion if a statistical algorithm predicts that the
offender has a high likelihood of recidivism. The committee reviewing the case has the discretion
to release the offender notwithstanding the result of the algorithm).
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vulnerability that requires multiple authentications, such as authentication
to an operating system as well as the application running on it, and a
vulnerability that requires authentication only to the operating system. A
more sophisticated authentication score might use three values that account
for whether exploitation requires no authentication, a single authentication,
or multiple authentications.317
The foreseeability metric is not intended to provide a conclusive
resolution of the issue of reasonable foreseeability, but it brings a measure
of objectivity to an issue that is often clouded by distortions, such as
hindsight bias. Research in behavioral psychology suggests, for instance,
that people tend to overstate the predictability of past events,318 and that
after-the-fact decisions by judges and juries about what an individual knew
or should have known may be influenced by knowledge of what actually
occurred.3 19 Social science researchers report that judges are as susceptible
to hindsight bias as the general public.
320
Empirical research suggests that hindsight bias extends to judgments
of reasonable foreseeability.32' Professors Susan LaBine and Gary LaBine
report results of a field experiment in which a sample of community
residents were asked to read different clinical scenarios involving treatment
of potentially dangerous patients.322 The scenarios presented different
outcomes: (1) the patient became violent, (2) the patient did not become
violent, or (3) no outcome was specified. The respondents were given
identical scenarios except for the outcome, and were asked to rate the
foreseeability of violence. The authors report that respondents who were
told that the patient did in fact become violent, rated violence as more
317. See Mell, Scarfone, & Romanosky, supra note 19, at 87.
318. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CH. L. REV. 571, 571 (1998) (stating that "psychologists have demonstrated
repeatedly that people overstate the predictability of past events - a phenomenon that
psychologists have termed the 'hindsight bias."').
319. See generally David A. Oliver, Toxic Torts: Risk, Foreseeability and Causation, TX.
LAWYER, Oct. 13, 2003, available at http://www.porterhedges.com/Toxic-Torts-Risk-
Foreseeability-And-Causation.aspx.
320. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 816
(2001).
321. Oliver, supra note 319, at 2 ("Judgments about foreseeability suffer similarly. By what
is called hindsight bias, decisions about what was known or knowable are repeatedly distorted in
favor of 'they knew it all along.' Hindsight bias occurs when knowledge of what actually
occurred causes overestimation of how predictable the outcome was .... The more awful the
outcome, the more judges and jurors will think it was foreseeable - regardless of how improbable
it might have appeared at the time.").
322. Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias,
20 LAW& HUM. BEHAV. 501 (1996).
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foreseeable. Respondents who were told that the patient did not become
violent reported that the absence of violence was more foreseeable.323
Cognitive biases in judicial decisions will likely be exacerbated where
issues involve complex novel technologies unfamiliar to decision-
324makers, and also in cases involving a high profile event that was widely
reported and that involved significant harm.325 These factors are often
present in information security breaches, such as virus and worm attacks,
identity theft, and denial of service attacks on high profile companies,
government agencies, and the national critical information infrastructure.
The analysis and results presented in this article attempt to contribute a
rational framework and methodology to assist judicial decisionmaking on
the issue of reasonable foreseeability in complex cases.
323. Id. at 511. Jeffrey Rachlinski cautions that, "(s)studies on the hindsight bias [and its
effect on foreseeability assessment] have documented its influence on probability estimates, not
on what could have been envisioned." Rachlinski, supra note 318, at 593.
324. See STEPHEN BREYER, EcoNoMIc REASONING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 12 (2003),
available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=672 (noting the
difficulty courts often have in assessing reasonableness in cases involving complex technologies).
See also Citron, supra note 2, at 265, n. 128 ("While lay juries ordinarily have difficulty assessing
negligence in complicated technical cases, juries may have an especially challenging time
assessing a database operator's care over its security system given the rapid changes in
technologies and new risks .... ").
325. See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 319 (reporting that "the more awful the outcome, the more
judges and jurors will think it was foreseeable - regardless of how improbable it might have
appeared at the time.").
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